Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1990

Kathy Lynn Higgins, individually and as guardian
ad litem for Shaundra Higgins, her daughter, v.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, by and through SALT
LAKE COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, DR.
WILLIAM KUENTZEL, SHERYL STEADMAN,
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH and THE
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH MEDICAL CENTER
: Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Patricia J. Marlowe; Bruce H. Jensen; Snow, Christensen & Martineau; attorneys for appellees.
Rodney G. Snow, Neil A. Kaplan, James L. Warlaumont; Clyde, Pratt & Snow; Stephen G. Stoker,
David B. Thomas; Stoker & Thomas; attorneys for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Higgins v. Salt Lake County, No. 90255.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2803

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
ry;
KF
4:> 9
/
/ "
,S9
•
d
M
i
M
M
Mi^
OOCKET N O J - —

VIE COURT

£

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KATHY LYNN HIGGINS, individually
and as guardian ad litem for
SHAUNDRA HIGGINS, her daughter,
Plaintiff-Appellant.
v.

Ca|se No. 90255

SALT LAKE COUNTY, by and through
SALT LAKE COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH,
DR. WILLIAM KUENTZEL, SHERYL
STEADMAN, THE UNIVERSITY OF
UTAH and THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
MEDICAL CENTER,

PRIORITY 16

Defendants-Appellees.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
On Appeal from the Judgments of the Third District Court
In and For Salt Lake County
Honorable James Sawayg, Judge

Patricia J. Marlowe
Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office
2001 South State Street
Room #S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
Attorney for Salt Lake
County
Bruce H. Jensen
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN &
MARTINEAU
1100 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for University
Medical Center

Rodney G. Snow, #3028
Neil A. Kaplan, #3974
James it. Warlaumont, #3386
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW
200 American Savings Plaza
77 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Stephen G. Stoker #3122
David ?. Thomas #3218
STOKER & THOMAS
311 South State, Suite 400
Salt Like City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

W\>

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KATHY LYNN HIGGINS, individually
and as guardian ad litem for
SHAUNDRA HIGGINS, her daughter,
Plaintiff-Appellant.
v.

Case No. 90255

SALT LAKE COUNTY, by and through
SALT LAKE COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH,
DR. WILLIAM KUENTZEL, SHERYL
STEADMAN, THE UNIVERSITY OF
UTAH and THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
MEDICAL CENTER,

PRIORITY 16

Defendants-Appellees.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
On Appeal from the Judgments of the Third District Court
In and For Salt Lake County
Honorable James Sawaya, Judge

Patricia J. Marlowe
Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office
2001 South State Street
Room #S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
Attorney for Salt Lake
County
Bruce H. Jensen
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN &
MARTINEAU
1100 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for University
Medical Center

Rodney G. Snow, #3028
Neil A. Kaplan, #3974
James L. Warlaumont, #3386
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW
200 American Savings Plaza
77 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Stephen G. Stoker #3122
David B. Thomas #3218
STOKER & THOMAS
311 South State, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

PARTIES
The parties to this litigation are:
Appellant:

Kathy Lynn Higgins, individually and as guardian
ad litem for her daughter Shaundra Higgins;

Appellees:

Salt Lake County, by and through Salt Lake County
Mental Health, Dr. William Kuentzel and Sheryl
Steadman;
The University of Utah and the University Medical
Center;

Other
Defendants:
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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction

is

vested

in

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

under

Article VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of Utah and Rules
4(a), 54(b) and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
!•

Did the lower court err in granting summary judgment

where there were issues of controverted material fact?
2.

Did the lower court err in granting summary judgment

that County Mental Health and the Medical Center owed no duty to
Kathy Higgins and her daughter, who was stabbed by Appellees'
mentally ill and dangerous patient with whom they had a special
relationship/ when County Mental Health and the Medical Center had
the right or ability to control their patient and negligently
breached the recognized standards in the community in failing to
do so?
3.

Did the lower court err in granting summary judgment that

County Mental Health and the Medical Center owed no duty to Kathy
Higgins and her daughter, who was stabbed by a mentally ill and
dangerous patient of County Mental Health and the Medical Center,
when their breach of recognized standards of care in the community
in evaluating and treating the patient caused the stabbing?
4.
County

Did the lower court err in granting summary judgment that
Mental

Health

owed

no

duty

to Kathy

Higgins and her

daughter, who was stabbed by a mentally ill patient placed into
the care and custody of County Mental Health as a condition of a
probation order, where the stabbing resulted from County Mental

Health's failing to evaluate and treat the patient as required by
the court order and from County Mental Health improperly causing
probation to terminate by making false and inadequate disclosures
to probation authorities?
5.
Courts

Did the lower court summary judgments violate the Open
Provision,

and

the

due

process

and

equal

protection

guarantees of the Utah and United States Constitutions?
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The determinative provisions are the Open Courts, due process
and equal protection guarantees of the Utah and United States
Constitutions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a civil action against Salt Lake County, by and
through Salt Lake County Mental

Health and

its employees Dr.

William Kuentzel and Sheryl Steadman (hereinafter "County Mental
Health"), and the University of Utah and the University Medical
Center

(hereinafter

"Medical Center") for permanent and severe

physical and psychological injuries suffered by Shaundra and Kathy
Higgins when Caroline Trujillo (hereinafter Trujillo), a dangerous
and mentally ill patient of the Appelleesf stabbed Shaundra on
April 10, 1984.-7
Appellant's

claims

against

County

Mental

Health

and

the

Medical Center are based upon their breach of a duty to meet
minimum

standards

recognized

in this community

in evaluating,

-Appellant's claims were brought in two seperate lawsuits which were consolidated into the present case. [R. at 7517521.
- 2 -

treating

and

controlling

their

dangerous

patient,

Trujillo,

including the minimum standards recognized in this community to
take reasonable and medically accepted precautions to control a
violent patient that is seeking in-patient hospitalization for her
mental illness.
The Appellant carefully pled her claims of negligence in the
lower court.

[R. at 955-973; 1030-1042]. The Complaints speci-

fically allege that County Mental Health and the Medical Center
breached

duties

owed

by

psychotherapist/mental

health

care

providers that have consistently been recognized by the Courts to
run to assaulted victims of mentally ill and dangerous patients,
including: (1) the duty arising from the "special relationship11
between the patient and her psychotherapist/mental

health care

providers; (2) the duty of the psychotherapist/mental health care
provider to properly treat the patient and to use reasonable care
to take necessary precautions to protect the patient's victims;
and, (3) the duty imposed upon and accepted by psychotherapist/
mental health care providers under court orders to care for and
treat a mentally ill probationer and to accurately and properly
advise

probation

authorities

about

the

probationer/patient's

2/
failure to meet court-ordered conditions.-

The Appellees moved for summary judgment asserting no duty

-The Amended Complaints also claim damages for the emotional
distress suffered by Shaundra's mother, Kathy Higgins, from the
stabbing. The arguments in this brief as to "duty11 owed Shaundra
apply to the emotional distress claim and Appellant asserts,
without repeating the arguments, that Appellees owed her this duty
as well.
- 3 -

was owed to Appellant and her daughter.

To support their motions,

the Appellees submitted lengthy statements of fact to minimize
their relationship with Trujillo and their involvement with her.
[R. at 1144-1252; 1849-1869].
Appellant disputed most of Appellees1 lengthy and unsupported
facts with precise citations to the record

[R. at 1609-1634,

1931-1983] and submitted detailed affidavits from respected local
mental health experts and from members of Trujillo's family to
show that, together with the deposition testimony, this stabbing
could have been avoided had the Appellees met appropriate and
recognized

standards

of

care

in evaluating, treating

trolling their dangerous and mentally ill patient.
1715;

1761-1767;

attached

2123-2126].

as Exhibits 1 for

Copies

of

the

or con-

[R. at 1701-

Affidavits

are

the experts and 2 for Trujillo's

family.
The lower court granted summary judgment on the basis that no
duty was owed to Appellant and her daughter.

[R. at 2346-2351].

Copies of the Judgments are attached as Exhibits 3 and 4.
lant

timely

filed

her

attached as Exhibit 5.

Notice

Appel-

of Appeal, a copy of which is

[R. at 2360].
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Every case thoughtfully examining the duties owed by psychotherapist/mental

health care providers to third parties arises

within the context of a trial of the facts of the particular

- 4 -

case.-

Recent cases from the Utah Supreme Court examining the

duty to control the conduct of a third person also carefully
review the facts to determine if a duty exists.-

The following

recitation of facts, and the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn in Appellant's favor, are based on this principle.

These

facts demonstrate the close and special relationship of County
Mental Health and the Medical Center and Trujillo, her long and
well-known

history

of violence

and

the

negligent

evaluation,

treatment and control of Trujillo resulting in the stabbing of
Shaundra.
A.

THE STABBING OF SHAUNDRA HIGGINS.

Trujillo, a known dangerous, mentally ill schizophrenic with
an organic brain disorder, began to display obvious signs of
increased psychotic disorder
1984.

in the late winter and spring of

[R. at 1761-1767; Aff'd. of Dr. Louis A. Moench].

Although a long-term patient of County Mental Health with a
history of voluntary and court-ordered

hospitalizations at the

Medical Center, Trujillo was negligently denied proper care and
treatment during
Medical

Center.

this time from County Mental Health and the
For

instance, she

was

not

voluntarily

nor

-See e.g., Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989);
Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064 (Del. 1988).
-7See Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1188-90 (Utah 1989)
(examining facts necessary to establish special relationship);
Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989) (examining history of
assailant's violence in considering duty).
- 5 -

involuntarily hospitalized when the standard of care mandated it for
her intensified psychotic and dangerous condition.

[R. at 1761-

1767, 2123-2126, 2127; Aff'ds. of Drs. Moench and Attiya].
On the afternoon of April 10, 1984, as Trujillo, then age 26,
sat alone in her bedroom, she thought about an imagined incident
between Shaundra Higgins and Trujillo1s daughter that Trujillo had
brooded over for six months.

Trujillo became quite agitated and

responded to an inner voice telling her to get a knife and stab
Shaundra.

[R. at 2067, 2068].

Psychotic symptoms like these had

caused Trujillo to act violently and stab other people in the past
and had led, among other things, to three involuntary commitments
by court order to County Mental Health and four involuntary commitments by court order to the Medical Center.

[R. at 1678, 1682,

1688, 21791.
Trujillo followed these voices and began walking toward the
Higgins home.

She stepped into an alley next to the home and

found Shaundra returning from an errand to a local 7-11 convenience store.

Trujillo stabbed Shaundra with a knife at least

three times, piercing Shaundra's chest, severing her aorta and
puncturing her abdomen.

[R. at 621-629, 2031-2037].

An ambulance

was summoned which rushed Shaundra to Primary Children's Hospital
where complex and delicate surgery was performed.
Shaundra is now afflicted with extensive and permanent scars
from the surgery, including one that runs the entire length of
Shaundra's chest and abdomen, together with two other scars from
the stabbing that indicate the precise locations where Trujillo
- 6 -

stuck the knife.

[Depo. of Kathy Higgins, p. 48-50, 72-90; R. at

2372].
The stabbing also strongly impacted Shaundra's and Kathy l s
emotional and psychological well-being.
stantial

psychiatric

disorder

which

Shaundra now has a sub-

impairs

her

interpersonal

relationships, education and employment prospects and which will
require intensive psychiatric therapy and possible hospitalization.

The disorder is manifested by nightmares, the fear of being

alone and a decline in school performance and grades.

In addi-

tion, Shaundra's mother, Kathy Higgins, suffers from emotional
distress that has also caused nightmares, fear of others and fear
for her now afflicted daughter.

[Depo. of Kathy Higgins, p.

48-50, 72-90; R. at 2372].
B.

TRUJILLO'S HISTORY OF MENTAL ILLNESS AND
VIOLENCE AND HER SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH AND THE MEDICAL CENTER.

Trujillo's stabbing of Shaundra Higgins followed a decade of
extensive, well-documented
assaultive criminal
5/
stabbing.1.

psychological

behavior

which

problems

included

and violent,

a similar violent

Trujillo's Mental Illness and Her Treatment From County
Mental Health and the Medical Center.
Trujillo, before and at the time she stabbed Shaundra, had

been diagnosed as having a major mental illness, schizophrenia,

- A lengthy chronology of Trujillo's history of psychiatric
problems is attached to Appellant's Opposition to the Medical
Center's Motion for Summary Judgment [R. at 2128-2234].
- 7 -

paranoid type, as well as organic brain dysfunction, and marginal
intelligence.

Her behavior fit into a category of an anti-social

personality disorder, which distinguished her from most schizophrenics and set her apart as someone needing extra attention and
precautions.
The

[Aff'd. of Dr. Louis A. Moench; R. at 1761 - 17671.

first

official

indications

of Trujillo's

illness and

anti-social behavior are documented in criminal records indicating
five arrests for being "ungovernable" as a young teenager [R. at
2023] and hospital records indicating Trujillo, at age fifteen,
was violent and belligerent and a user of amphetamines, barbituates, hallucinogenics, heroine, cocaine and "anything that she
can get her hands on."

[R. at 2142].

Trujillo was placed by Court order in a detention center to
control this destructive behavior and then was involuntarily and
"temporarily" committed by Court Order for hospitalization to the
Medical Center after she made delusionary claims that her parents
were trying to kill her.
As

early

as

[R. at 650, 663, 1679 and 1680].

1976,

the

Medical

Center

itself

diagnosed

Trujillo as a paranoid schizophrenic with poor judgment and no
insight into her illness.

[R. at 660].

Three physicians, in-

cluding ones from the Medical Center, testified at a mental health
hearing that resulted in Trujillo's temporary commitment becoming
an indeterminent order of hospitalization, there being no appropriate, less restrictive alternative.

- 8 -

[R. at 1679].

Thereafter, as an involuntarily committed patientf Trujillo
was transferred to the care of County Mental Health where her
course of treatment consisted of failed appointments for therapy
and where she demonstrated vague, global and anxious tendencies,
with

forced

thoughts.

and

irregular

speech

and

loose

and

tangential

County Mental Health psychiatrists also diagnosed her

as a schizophrenic at this early age.

[R. at 633-6341.

Trujillo was again involuntarily hospitalized at the Medical
Center in 1978 after she had abandoned a ten-day-old child at Holy
Cross Hospital because she was delusional.

She was treated with

in-patient therapy and then discharged to be followed by County
Mental

Health

where

she

assault and felony theft.

was

almost

immediately

arrested

for

[R. at 634, 667, 668, 2033, 2153].

The Courts sent Trujillo to the Utah State Hospital to determine if she was competent to stand trial.

[R. at 670]. Trujillo

was threatening and violent at the hospital and State Hospital
psychiatrists diagnosed her as having borderline to below normal
intelligence,
psychotic

with

probable

organic

features, including

brain

schizophrenia

syndrome
and

disorder with anti-social and hysterical features.

and

some

a personality
[R. at 571-

576].
Trujillo was eventually determined to be "competent" and was
released from the State Hospital.

[R. at 577]

Five months after

her release, she was again committed by Court Order to the Medical
Center

for

a fourth

time because she had been arrested, was
- 9 -

threatening social workers, having trouble with police arrests and
altercations and evidencing increased paranoia.
order

of

hospitalization

on

this

occasion

[R. at 579]. The
again

found

that

Trujillo was mentally ill and needed custodial caref there being
no less restrictive alternative.

[R. at 16821.

The Medical

Center on this occasion evaluated Trujillo as follows:
This is the fourth psychiatric admission for
this patient diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenia. There have been previous problems of
disposition as well as previous involuntary
commitments. It should be noted that she has
had trouble in the past following medication
instructions,
caring
for
herself,
and
children.
[R. at 21791.
Trujillo was again discharged from the hospital with followup care to be provided by County Mental Health.
was admitted
determine
senior

In 1981, Trujillo

to the Utah State Hospital for a second time to

if she was competent

citizen.

to stand trial for stabbing a

[R. at 2195].

The medical

records on this

occasion describe Trujillo as talking to herself and then stabbing
the senior citizen while yelling, "Die, bitch."

[R. at 2202].

The records further show Trujillo's family pleading for help and
warning that Trujillo had to be arrested to be hospitalized.

[R.

at 2203].
While hospitalized for this earlier stabbing, Trujillo was
diagnosed as having "subnormal intelligence crowded by the appearance of a mild organic brain syndrome and a personality style with
anti-social features."

[R. at 2201].
- 10 -

She attacked patients and

had to be secluded.

[R. at 21971.

After her medications were

increased to therapeutic levels/ she was found competent and not
overtly psychotic and returned
trial.

to the criminal court to stand

[R. at 2197] .

Trujillo pled guilty to this stabbing and to other charges
pending against her for striking pedestrians.

[R. at 1688-1690].

She was placed on probation with the condition she receive mental
health care from County Mental Health.

[R. at 1688 -1690].

As a

condition of this probation, Trujillo was required to receive
treatment three times a week

[R. at 1725] and see her primary

therapist once a week at County Mental Health.

As set forth in

detail below, Trujillo utterly failed to meet these conditions [R.
at 1727-1730] and her probation was improperly terminated because
of representations made by County Mental Health that Trujillo had
complied with the conditions of probation.

[R. at 1737].

After the probation terminated, Trujillo began to display
obvious signs that her condition was worsening.

She suffered

persistent auditory hallucinations, confusion and thought distubances.

She engaged in self-harmful acts, including attempted

suicide, and erratically used medications prescribed for her.
at 1761-1767].
care and

[R.

As shown below, she sought, but was denied, the

treatment from County Mental

Health and the Medical

Center that was necessary to control her and avoid the stabbing of
Shaundra.

[R. at 1761-1767, 2123-2126].

A number of mental health experts evaluated Trujillo after
the stabbing.

Virtually every one of them indicated the stabbing
- 11 -

could be attributed to Trujillo's mental illness and propensity
for violence.

Trujillo was seen as (1) mentally ill, dangerous

and in need of care and treatment in an in-patient hospital before
the stabbing

[Aff'd. of Dr. Manya Attiya, R. at 1673-1676]; (2)

having a very constricted mental status which was compatible with
mild to moderate mental retardation, exhibiting signs of paranoid
schizophrenia, that made Trujillo an ongoing threat to others and
likely to repeat her assaultive behavior

[Report of Dr. Allen

Jeppson; R. at 629-6321; and, (3) having an organic brain impairment with a schizophrenic personality disorder that made Trujillo
a danger to others with little ability to appreciate the extent
and consequences of her actions.

[Depo. of Dr. Robert Howell, p.

38 and Exhibit 4 to Depo; R. at 2369].
Dr.

Louis

A.

Moench,

a

licensed

general

and

forensic

psychiatrist, reviewed the medical records and the depositions of
Appellees1 key employees in this case.

[R. at 1761-1767].

full affidavit is set forth as Exhibit 1.

His

Dr. Moench unequivo-

cally concluded that Trujillo presented an unacceptable high level
of risk prior to the stabbing because of her mental illness and
substantial history of violence that set her apart from other
schizophrenics.

He further noted that Appellees acted negligently

in assessing Trujillo's treatment and in failing to hospitalize
her.

[R. at 1761-1767].

Indeed, his testimony, together with

that of Dr. Manya Attiya, indicates that had the proper evaluation
and treatment been provided, including hospialization, Trujillo's
- 12 -

psychosis and the risk of violence could have been better controlled and it would have been unlikely that this stabbing would
have occurred.
2.

[R. at 1761-1767, 1673-16771.

The Criminal and Violent History of Trujillo Which
County Mental Health and the Medical Center Knew or
Should Have Known.
Trujillo

Appellees

had

knew

or

Trujillo's medical

a

long
could

history
have

records.

of violence

easily

learned

That history

and

crime that

from

examining

is set out in full

detail as Exhibit 19 to Appellant's Opposition to the Medical
Center's Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. at 2241-2282].
The record in this case shows Trujillo had committed several
violent and assaultive acts between the ages of twelve and twentythree,

from

attempted

1972

suicide

through

1981.

For

instance, Trujillo

had

[R. at 2239], had been declared ungovernable

five times [R. at 2239] , had been diagnosed as a danger to herself
and others [R. at 2243], had been repeatedly arrested for loitering and loitering for the purposes of prostitution [R. at 2240] ,
had

been

arrested

for

trespassing

[R. at 2240] and had been

arrested for assault and battery and for theft.

[R. at 2240].

In addition, Trujillo had been committed by Court order to
the Medical Center on four separate occasions [R. at 2180], had
been committed to the care of County Mental Health on at least two
occasions [R. at 1680, 1688] and had twice been committed to the
care of the Utah State Hospital

[R. at 2199].

Many of these

commitments were characterized by assaults and threats on jailers
- 13 -

[R. at 2263], hospital staff [R. at 2278 and 2269], social workers
and

other

patients

[R. at

2252,

2257

and

2273].

On many

occasions, Trujillo was placed in closed wards, in seclusion and
in restraints to control her violence. [R. at 2252 and 2272].
In July, 1981, at the age of twenty-three, Trujillo was
arrested
Police

in Ogden for assaulting pedestrians.
indicated

on

this occasion

that

The Ogden City

"a crazy

lady" using

obscene gestures and abusive language struck several pedestrians,
including a woman and her small child.

[R. at 581].

Trujillo

pled guilty to the reduced charge of disorderly conduct, [R. at
713] and sentencing was continued until August 1981, pending the
completion of a presentence report, during which time Trujillo was
placed non her own recognizance."

[R. at 713, 714].

Trujillo failed to appear for sentencing and was arrested in
September 1981, in Salt Lake City for the unprovoked stabbing of a
senior citizen.

As briefly set forth in the following chart, the

facts

stabbing

of

that

are

remarkably

similar

to

Shaundra's

stabbing:
1981 Stabbing of
Senior Citizen

1984 Stabbing of
Shaundra

Address:

505 East 900 South

932 Princeton (1052 S.)

Address of Victim:

846 South Park St.

932 Princeton

Injury Inflicted:

Stab wound

Stab wound to heart and
abdomen

Weapon:

Pocket knife

Small knife
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Description of
stabbing:

Victim had just
left 7-11 when
Trujillo ran toward
her with concealed
knife and stabbed
her.

Shaundra was coming
home from 7-11 when
Trujillo ran toward
her with a concealed
knife,

[R. at 2202-2203].
Trujillo pled "no contest" to assault charges for the 1981
stabbing and was sentenced to one year probation on the condition
she be treated by County Mental Health in a group home.
was also placed

Trujillo

in the care of County Mental Health for the

reduced disorderly conduct charge she pled to in Ogden.
1688].

[R. at

As conditions of her sentences, Trujillo was required to

continue to take medications/ to receive mental health treatments
three days a week and to visit Sheryl Steadman, her "primary
therapist," at County Mental Health.
County Mental
conditions.

Health was consulted

[R. at 1725].
about

Importantly,

and agreed

to these

[Steadman Depo. at 91; R. at 1725].

Trujillo stayed in the group home a short while and utterly
failed to meet any of the other court-ordered conditions of her
probation.

She rarely attended the daily sessions and she failed

to attend weekly visits to Appellee Steadman.
Eventually, she grew increasingly psychotic.

[R. at 1727-1730].
[R. at 1731].

Even

so, County Mental Health erroneously advised probation authorities
at the end of one year that Trujillo was "taking her medications
and

attending

her

treatment

sessions."
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[R. at 1733].

The

authorities were also advised
"continue

to monitor

therapy."

her medication" and

[R. at 1744].

tions , probation

that County Mental Health would
"urge her

to attend

Based upon these erroneous representa-

officials

recommended

and

in 1983

the Court

ordered termination of Trujillo's probation. [R. at 1744].
Subsequent to the erroneous termination of her probation,
Trujillo began to be more tangential and to decompensate.
2232].

She specifically

sought to be hospitalized

[R. at

by County

Mental Health and the Medical Center, both of which negligently
failed to hospitalize, treat and control her.
C.

COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH'S AND THE MEDICAL CENTER'S
TREATMENT AND CONTROL OF TRUJILLO IMMEDIATELY
BEFORE AND AT THE TIME OF THE STABBING.

In the three months prior to Shaundra Higgins1 stabbing,
Trujillo and her family desperately sought treatment and care from
County Mental Health and the Medical Center to control Trujillo's
psychosis and violence. [Aff'd. of Rebecca Navarro; R. at 1701;
Aff'd.

of

Richard

Navarro;

R.

at

1708;

Aff'd.

of

Dorothy

Candelaria; R. at 1713].
Indeed, Trujillo, in "crisis" and on her own initiative,
sought care and treatment in January of 1984, when, without an
appointment, she went to County Mental Health to obtain medications.

County Mental Health, although noting Trujillo to be

"demanding to see her primary therapist," agitated," "unreasonable" and "angry," refused to prescribe the medications.
Depo. at 40; R. at 2234, 2377].
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[Crosby

Trujillo went to see her primary therapist, Sheryl Steadman
one week later for a "regular appointment," which appointments she
had

repeatedly

failed

to attend

in the past.

Trujillo had head and neck tremors.

At the time,

Steadman did not change her

usual "approach" to Trujillo and prescribed a dosage of medication
that

was

inadequate,

even

though

tangential" as to make Steadman

Trujillo was

so

"loose and

unsure whether Trujillo could

comprehend what Steadman was telling her about her medications.
[R. at 2234; Steadman Depo. at 125-128; R. at 23711.
Shortly thereafter, on February 17, 1984, Trujillo again went
to see

Sheryl

Steadman

who found

her

"funny today" and only

capable of answering "yes" or "no" to open-ended questions.
at 2235].

[R.

Again, Steadman merely prescribed the medications

Trujillo had been receiving.

Importantly, Steadman did not con-

sult with Dr. William Kuentzel, the County Mental Health psychiatrist "responsible" for Trujillo

[Steadman Depo. at 116; R. at

2371], and her failure to do so fell far below the standard of
care.

[Aff'd. of Dr. Moench, R. at 1764-1766].

In addition, Dr. Kuentzel did not see Trujillo at all in
1984.

Medications continued to be prescribed by nurses, which

medications

were

insufficient

to

control

Trujillo"s

psychotic

symptoms and propensity for violence, [Aff'd. of Dr. Moench, R. at
1765, 1766], and which medications were even less than those
necessary

and

considered

appropriate
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by another

County Mental

Health psychiatrist.

[R. at 17651.6/

On February 25, 1984, Trujillo's aunt, a nurse employed in a
psychiatric ward at Pioneer Valley Hospital, called County Mental
Health, claiming Trujillo had slit her wrists, was threatening
suicide and requesting that Trujillo be hospitalized because her
family could not handle her.
Candelaria; R. at 1713].

[R. at 1893; Aff'd. of Dorothy

County Mental Health referred Trujillo

to the Medical Center but told her aunt that "no county beds were
available," [R. at 1893], purportedly referring to a contractual
arrangement between County Mental Health and the Medical Center
through which the Medical Center served as the "in-patient unit"
for

County Mental Health.

[R. at 2082-2096].

However, when

deposed, the Supervisor of County Mental Health responsible for
the telephone service, testified that "no county beds available"
really meant there were "no beds available for people who had no
funds to pay."
Trujillo

[Depo. of Sue Fisher, p. 32].
and

her

mother

went

to

the

Medical

Center

on

February 25, 1984. At the time of their arrival, Trujillo's chief

-County Mental Health followed the substandard procedure of
allowing a nurse to prescribe medications and have a doctor at a
later time sign the record for legal purposes.
Dr. Kuentzel
admitted in his deposition that nurses prescribed medication for
Trujillo; and the records show he personally evaluated her only
one time in 1977. Dr. Kuentzel admitted he never devised a treatment plan for Trujillo and never undertook to determine if
Trujillo could follow through with treatments [Kuentzel Depo. Vol.
1 Page 53, 55 and 72; R. at 2152]. Although the records show Dr.
Kuentzel prescribed substantial psychotropic medications from 1977
to 1984 for Trujillo, including an ineffective amount just before
the stabbing, he swore under oath: "I have very little memory of
Caroline Trujillo at all." [Kuentzel Depo. at 851.
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medical complaint was a lacerated wrist from a suicide attempt.
Both Trujillo and her mother

requested

that Trujillo

"crisis people" [Ashcraft Depo. at 35; R. at 2370]].
mother

specifically

requested

see the

Trujillo's

her daughter be admitted

hospital because of her mental illness.

to the

[R. at 1701-1705].

The lacerated wrist was treated by Scott Lechman, a medical
student

not yet

licensed

to practice.

Mr. Lechmanf

although

having no psychiatric training, recalled Trujillo as a "Hispanic
woman sitting on a structure, accompanied by another person, with
this wound

on her wrist."

He further

recalled that Trujillo

absurdly claimed to be "angry with God for about a year" and
described her as "an obviously disturbed woman."

[Lechman Depo.

at 35-38].
Trujillo

was

then

referred

to

specialist" and a registered nurse.

Katy

Jones,

a

"crisis

Nurse Jones had never taken a

course in treating mentally ill individuals with criminal backgrounds and had only limited authority at the Medical Center.

She

was a part-time nurse who was not able to, for instance, admit a
patient without consulting a physican.

[Jones Depo. at 43, 50,

and 56; R. at 2371].
Nurse
procedure

Jones
to

interviewed

assess

Trujillo's

recognized standards of care.
17671.

Specifically,

Trujillo

Nurse

and

condition

her
that

mother
did

using a
not

meet

[Aff'd. of Dr. Moench; R. at 1761Jones

did

not

review

Trujillo's

extensive medical records and file, [Jones Depo. at 81; R. at
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2374] , so she did not even know Trujillo had four prior commitments and was a dangerous paranoid schizophrenic.
Jones even call a resident psychotherapist.

Nor did Nurse

[Jones Depo. at 110;

R. at 2374].
Nurse Jones was advised by Trujillo1s mother that Trujillo
had been "behaving in an erratic manner" [Jones Depo. at 85; R. at
2374],

"had

episodes

of

self-abuse"

including

"head

banging,

bruising and cutting" [Jones Depo. at 85; R. at 2371], and was
having "persistent auditory hallucinations" that "instruct her to
harm herself and insist she must die."
2371].
thought

[Jones Depo. at 87; R. at

Nurse Jones viewed Trujillo as having confusion in her
processes,

"intertwined

with

hallucinations

sions." [Jones Depo at 89-99; R. at 2374].
"turmoil

going

on

in her

head" with

and delu-

In fact, there was

thoughts

compromised

"hallucinations and delusions" while at the Medical Center.
type of hallucination precipitated
tion."

the

"self-inflicted

[Jones Depo. at 90 -94; R. at 2374].

by

This

lacera-

Finally, Nurse Jones

found Trujillo was "tearful," her memory of recent and remote
events was "poor" and her "insight and judgment was impaired."
[Jones Depo. at 94; R. at 2379].
Despite

this appearance

and

the existence

of a recorded

diagnosis of schizophrenia and violence, Nurse Jones reached a
totally

erroneous

diagnosis

suffering from a minor

that Trujillo was

"affective" disorder.

"depressed" and
[Jones Depo. at

75-76; R. at 2379; Aff'd. of Dr. Moench, R. at 1761 to 1766].
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Nurse Jones thereafter lied to

Trujillo's mother, telling her a

bed was not available [R. at 1703-1704], even though the records
establish beds were available [R. at 2112-2113] and there was no
limit on the so-called "county beds."
at 2380].

[Erickson Depo. at 109; R.

Instead of taking the necessary and medically required

steps to admit Trujillo, Nurse Jones referred her to County Mental
Health for a "crisis" admit in a group home known as the Adult
Residential Treatment Unit

(ARTU).

[R. at 1897].

this referral violated the Medical Center's

Importantly,

own policy that a

psychotic or actively suicidal patient or a patient in need of
constant supervision not be sent to ARTU.

[R. at 2110].

ARTU was a minimally therapeutic setting without adequately
qualified or sufficiently available staff to treat Trujillo.
at 1668].

[R.

It was not an appropriate substitute for the in-patient

hospitalization Trujillo required.

[Id; R. at 1761-1766].

Even

the part-time psychiatrist at ARTU described it as not providing
the degree of protection or the level of consistency of care of a
hospital.

[Ely Depo at 90; R. at 2376].

Nevertheless, Trujillo

was referred to this "stepped down" facility on the basis that she
could then be seen by Sheryl Steadman, her primary therapist;
however, Sheryl Steadman never saw Trujillo while she was in ARTU.
[Steadman Depo. at 139; R. at 2371].
Even though Trujillo's family did not believe the group home
would help her, they took her there because they could not afford
a private hospital and because they believed Trujillo would be
- 21 -

returned to the Medical Center once a bed became available.
at 1701-1712].

[R.

At the group home, Trujillo was met by a "crisis

line" phone receptionist.

The crisis line worker, who was not

authorized to diagnose patients, [Romero Depo. at 40] conceived of
and authored ARTU's

"treatment plan" for Trujillo without the

assistance of a physician and in contravention of County Mental
Health's own policies and procedures.
p.

51.

The

"plan," developed

[Romero Depo. Vol. II. at

without

consultation with Ms.

Steadman or Dr. Kuentzel and without review of Trujillo's medical
records [Romero Depo. at 81], called for Trujillo to stay at ARTU
for the short term in order to assess her living environment.
[Romero Depo. Ex. 51.

The plan was based upon the telephone

worker's erroneous impression that Trujillo's main problem was
simply, "manipulative, attention-seeking behavior."

[Romero Depo.

at 86].
While she stayed at ARTU for approximately the next sixteen
days, Trujillo was never seen by the "responsible physician," Dr.
William Kuentzel or by her "primary therapist," Sheryl Steadman.
On two brief occasions she was seen by a Dr. Joy Ely, a part-time
psychiatrist whose limited role was to evaluate ARTU residents for
medications.

[Ely Depo. at 22; R. at 2376].

Dr. Ely candidly

admitted in her deposition that she had no training with mentally
ill individuals with criminal backgrounds, was not involved in
treatment plans for group home residents, was not involved in
directly working with residents and had learned "quite quickly"
- 22 -

that the ARTU staff would not allow her to refer a resident for
hospitalization.

[Ely Depo. at 31, 32f 36 and 46; R. at 23761.

Dr. Ely also evaluated Trujillo without medical records and
without talking to Dr. Kuentzel.

Her interviews were so limited

she had no independent recollection of Trujillo.
138; R. at 2376].
that

indicated

[Ely Depo. at

She was able to interpret her notes of Trujillo
Trujillo

was

"erratic"

(inconsistent),

"non-

adaptive" (not aware of what she was doing), "labile" (crying one
minute, laughing the next, angry another time) and displaying a
complete "lack of insight."

[Ely Depo. at 69-75; R. at 2376].

Dr. Ely prescribed substantial increases in dosages of the psychotropic medications Trujillo was taking for these problems, [Ely
Depo. at 77; R. at 2376] but these increased dosages were never
administered.

[Stevens Depo. at 36; R. at 2382].

Trujillo's dramatic psychosis and symptoms continued while in
ARTU.

Once she left and returned within hours because she felt

suicidal. [Whitaker Depo., Ex. 3, R. at 2373].
left "against" medical advice.

[Ld.].

Another time she

Trujillo again requested

to be hospitalized at the Medical Center, but her request was
denied.

[R. at 2235].

Trujillo was sent home by ARTU on March 15, 1984, even though
her family was reluctant to take her back because of the hallucinations, delusions and violence.

[Id.]

The family took Trujillo

back, however, because she "had no other place to go."
Id.].
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[R. at

At

this

time, Trujillo

was

placed

as a patient

in the

"evening-weekend" program operated by County Mental Health.

This

program was not mental health treatment but was to provide a
transition into the community from ARTU.
R. at 23711.

[Steadman Depo. at 150;

Predictably, the therapist for the program did not

see Trujillo after she left ARTU and Trujillo missed most of the
"evening-weekend" sessions required by the program.

[R. at 0177].

Indeed, at the very time Shaundra Higgins was stabbed, Trujillo
was supposed to be in a recreational session for the program.

[R.

at 1757].
Trujillo was seen by Sheryl Steadman during a one-half hour
appointment between the time she was released from ARTU and when
she

stabbed

Shaundra.

Steadman

diagnosed

Trujillo

as being

stable, in part because Trujillo indicated that she was starting a
dish

washing

job arranged

for

her,

[R. at

2235], which

job

Trujillo hysterically quit on her first day because the dishes
were talking to her.

[R. at 1708 to 17111 •

Steadman did not

alter Trujillo's medications, so they remained at an insufficient
level to control Trujillo; and Dr. Kuentzel, following substandard
procedures,

approved

this

inadequate

without seeing Trujillo at all.
D.

medication

prescription

[R. at 2235].

COUNTY MENTAL HEALTHS AND THE MEDICAL CENTER'S
FAILURE TO MEET STANDARDS OF CARE IN CONTROLLING
AND TREATING TRUJILLO•

Appellant submitted uncontradicted affidavits from Dr. Louis
A. Moench and Dr. Manya Attya to oppose the summary judgment
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motions.

These

affidavits

indicate

Trujillo

was

a

violent/

mentally ill patient that was negligently treated and controlled
by Appellees in contravention to the recognized standard of care.
Indeed/

in

their

affidavits/

Psychiatrists

Moench

and

persuasively establish:
1. Trujillo presented an unacceptably high
level of risk at the time of the stabbing that
she would act violently toward herself and
others.
2. The Appellees should have known, by a
proper evaluation and diagnosis of Caroline
Trujillo/ of the unacceptable high level of
risk.
3. The Appellees failed to properly assess
and treat the risk because/ among other things:
(a) they did not review medical records;
(b) they did not involve experienced and
qualified personnel to evaluate and diagnose
Trujillo;
(c) they failed to provide meaningful psychiatric intervention;
(d) they allowed medication to be prescribed
by non-psychiatrists which medication was less
than that recommended to control Trujillof
even by ARTU's own psychiatric doctors;
(e) they did little to evaluate and diffuse
Trujillo's propensities for violence; and/
(f) Appellees should have either voluntarily or involuntarily hospitalized Trujillo for
an extended period.
4. Had the Appellees met the appropriate
standard of caref Trujillo's psychosis would
have been better controlled/ the risk for
violence
significantly
reduced and it is
unlikely this stabbing would have occurred.
[R. at 1761-1767/ 2123-2126].
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Attiya

From these expert opinions and evidence, a jury can easily
find this tragic stabbing could and should have been avoided had
the Appellees only met recognized standards of care.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case presents important issues concerning the duty of
psychotherapists/mental

health

professionals

to

follow

the

standard of care in the profession and control and properly treat
mentally ill and violent patients that injure innocent victims.
A.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECIDING ON SUMMARY
JUDGMENT THAT NO DUTY WAS OWED.

Duty is a legal question that is fact-dependent in this case
and requires a review of the facts. Almost all of the courts that
have examined the question of the duty owed by psychotherapists/
hospitals to third parties have carefully reviewed the facts at
trial.

The lower court committed error in granting summary judg-

ment when there were extensive disputes of material fact.

Doe v.

Arguelles, 716 P.2d 179, 280 (Utah 1985).
B.

UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH
AND THE MEDICAL CENTER OWED WELL-RECOGNIZED DUTIES
TO KATHY AND SHAUNDRA HIGGINS TO CONTROL AND PROPERLY
TREAT THEIR DANGEROUS PATIENT.

Courts and

commentators

have

recognized

which an affirmative legal duty is owed by

three bases upon
psychotherapists/-

mental health care providers to innocent victims injured by their
dangerous patients:
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1.

County Mental Health and The Medical Center Had a
Special Relationship With Trujillo Requiring Them
to Control and Properly Treat Her,
Under the Restatement

tive duty

(Second) of Torts, § 315, an affirma-

is owed to victims of dangerous mental patients by

psychotherapists/mental

health

care

providers

to

control

the

actions of their dangerous patients as a result of the "special
relationship" existing with their patients.

The duty was owed in

this case because of Trujillo1s relationship with County Mental
Health

and

the Medical

Center

and

their

right or ability to

control her.
2.

County Mental Health and the Medical Center Owed
a Duty as Psychotherapists/Mental Health Care
Providers to Use Reasonable Care to Take Precautions
to Protect Kathy and Shaundra Higgins.
Historically, health care professionals have had an affirma-

tive duty to protect the public from their dangerous patients.

A

large number of courts have extended this duty to the psychotherapists/mental health care providers to provide the necessary
care and treatment to protect innocent victims from a dangerous
and

mentally

ill

patient.

The

duty

is

to meet

reasonable

standards of care, ordinarily possessed and exercised by members
of the profession, to properly control and treat the patient.
3.

County Mental Health Owed Duties Arising Out of
Two Court Sentences Placing Trujillo Into Its Care.
Salt Lake County Mental Health owed duty, arising from its

agreement to properly control and treat Trujillo when she was
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placed into its care as a probationer under two criminal sentences.

County Mental Health agreed but failed to provide the

treatment and then caused probation to terminate by falsely reporting to probation authorities that Trujillo had been treated
and would continue to receive mental health treatments.

Shaundra

Higgins has an actionable claim arising out of the failure to
provide the court-ordered treatments and accurate information to
probation authorities.
C.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S HOLDING VIOLATES OPEN ACCESS
TO COORT, DDE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES
OF THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS.

The District

Court's

holding

in this case violates open

access to court, due process and equal protection guarantees of
the Utah and United States Constititions because it deprives the
plaintiff

of

discriminates

a

remedy

at

law

for her

against victims who are

injuries
injured

and

unfairly

by health care

providers who breach accepted standards of care and by making a
certain

group

of

"therapists"

immune

from

suit

despite

that

breach.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
This case addresses important issues concerning the legal
rights of Shaundra and Kathy Higgins, injured due to the negligence of County Mental Health and the Medical Center, who were
entrusted with the care of Trujillo, a mentally ill and violent
patient.

Specifically at issue is the question of the legal duty
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owed by County Mental Health and the Medical Center to Kathy and
Shaundra in the factual context of this case.

Importantly, Kathy

and Shaundra have not and are not seeking a ruling that County
Medical Health and the Medical Center are strictly liable for all
harmful

acts

patients.

committed

by

their

mentally

ill

and

dangerous

Rather, Kathy and Shaundra seek only to hold County

Mental Health and the Medical Center responsible for breaching
their duty to control and properly treat their patient, using the
accepted standards of care, when that breach caused Shaundra to be
7/
viciously stabbed.Recent Utah Supreme Court pronouncements and the majority of
case law from other jurisdictions, as well as sound public policy,
recognize a duty of psychotherapists and mental health care providers to victims of their mentally ill patients to use reasonable care in diagnosing and treating patients that are known or
should be known, in accordance with the standards of the psychiatric profession, to present a danger to themselves or others. In
appropriate

circumstances,

this means

the

psychotherapist

and

mental health care provider must take reasonable precautions to
control the patient, especially where the right or ability to
control the patient is not at issue.

— "Recognition of an affirmative duty owed persons other
than the patient does not mean the psychiatrist is liable for the
negligence of the patient.
Rather, the psychiatrist will be
liable only when his own negligence is responsible for the injury
in question."
Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064 (Del. 1988).
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The compelling facts in this case present just such a circumstance.

Trujillo voluntarily submitted to the control of County

Mental Health and the Medical Center by seeking hospitalization
for her

illness. She also came directly under the control of

County Mental Health because of the two court sentences placing
her in its care.
A.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND RULING THAT NO DUTY TO CONTROL
AND PROPERLY TREAT TRUJILLO WAS OWED WHEN
THERE WERE DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT.

This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment.

As

such, this Court gives no deference to the trial court's conclusions.

Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636

(Utah 1989).
Also, fundamental to the consideration of this case is the
propriety of awarding summary judgment despite the existence of
disputed issues of material Fact.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

While

"duty" is a legal question, it is also highly fact-dependent and
requires a careful

review

of the facts.

Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989).

See e.g. Owens v.

Accordingly, almost all of

the courts that have examined the question of the duty owed by
psychotherapist/hospitals to third parties have done so only in
the context of a full trial of the facts.

See e.g. Perreira v.

State of Colorado, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989); Naidu v. Laird, 539
A.2d 1064 (Del. 1988).
There were many disputes of material fact in the court below.
The standard of review on summary judgment requires all facts and
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all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom to be reviewed in the
light most favorable to the appellant and her daughter/ with all
doubts being resolved in their favor.

Doe v, Arguelles, 716 P.2d

179, 280 (Utah 1985).
Under this standard, it is apparent that the lower court
erred.

When the uncontroverted facts are viewed in a light most

favorable to the Kathy and Shaundra Higgins, it is undeniable that
County Mental Health and the Medical Center owed a duty when the
Appellees had the right and ability to control Trujillo and the
standard of care required them to do so.

The facts are clear that

Trujillo was dangerous and mentally ill, that she presented an
unacceptable risk of harm and that Appellees had the ability and
right and did actually control her.

Appellant is entitled to show

at trial that the injuries suffered were proximately caused by
Appellees1
imposed

failure to meet even the minimal standards of care

in

patient.
B.

this

community

in treating

and

controlling

their

Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064 (Del. 1988).
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH AND THE MEDICAL CENTER OWED
A DUTY TO CONTROL AND PROPERLY TREAT TRUJILLO SO
AS NOT TO INJURE KATHY AND SHAUNDRA HIGGINS UNDER
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.

The courts which have considered the question of the affirmative duty owed by psychotherapists and mental health care providers to innocent victims provide three bases that give rise to a
"duty."

The first recognizes that certain relationships provide

for legal duty:

"The relationship giving rise to that duty may be
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found

either

patient

in

that

existing

between

the

therapist

and

the

[citation ommitted] or in the more broadly based obliga-

tion the practitioner may have to protect the welfare of the
community."
1973).

Mcintosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500, 511-12 (N.J. Super.

See also Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064 (Del. 1988).

In addition, the courts have imposed a duty running to victims
when a mental health care provider such as County Mental Health
agrees to provide mental health care for a mentally ill probationer

with

a

history

of

violence.

Semler

v.

Psychiatric

Institute of Washington D.C., 538 F.2d 121, 127 (4th Cir. 1976),
cert, denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1977); see also Whalen v. State of
Nevada, 679 P.2d 248 (Nev. 1984); Payton v. United States, 679
F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982).
Appellant's
Appellant

claims

carefully

are

alleged

founded

upon

these

three

bases.

that County Mental Health and the

Medical Center breached the duty created by their special relationship with Trujillo, by their professional obligations and by the
agreement to provide care and treatment to Trujillo under the two
sentencing orders.
1.

The Special Relationship Between Trujillo and County
Mental Health and the Medical Center Gave Rise to a
Duty to Shaundra and Kathy Higgins to Meet Appropriate
Standards of Care in Controlling and Treating Trujillo.
The first and most frequently relied upon basis to impose

legal duty is set forth as an exception to the proposition found
in Section 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that absent a
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"special relationship" there is no duty to control the conduct of
a third person to prevent physical harm to another.
Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187 1189 (Utah 1989).

Owens v.

The Utah Supreme Court

has established that a "special relationship" cannot be determined
in the abstract but applies to different situations from which
legal rights and obligations flow:
Determining whether one party has an
affirmative duty to protect another from the
other's own acts or those of a third party,
requires a careful consideration of the
consequences for the parties and society at
large. If the duty is realistically incapable
of performance, or if it is fundamentally at
odds with the nature of the party's relationship, we should be loath to determine that
relationship "special" and to impose a resulting "duty" for it is meaningless to speak of a
"special relationship duty" in the abstract.
These terms are only labels which the legal
system applies to different situations to
indicate that certain rights and obligations
flow from them; they are "an expression of the
sum total of those considerations of policy
which lead the law to say that a particular
plaintiff is entitled to protection.
W.
Prosser, Law of Torts, 333 (3rd Ed. 1964),
quoted in Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135,
138 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 446 U.S.
909, 100 S.Ct. 1836, 64 L.Ed.2d 261 (1980).
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 418 (Utah 1986).
Most commentators and almost all courts have recognized the
relationship of a hospital

or psychotherapist and a dangerous

mental patient as such a "special relationship."

This is because

such a relationship typically allows for the right or ability to
control

the

patient

and

the

standard

imposed

on the psycho-

therapist or health care provider is only that which is recognized
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in the community.

Thus, the duties imposed are realistically

capable of performance and are commonly accepted and understood.
Indeed, where the patient seeks treatment and hospitalization, the
duty is in harmony and not at odds with the nature of the relationship.

See Prosser and Keaton, Law of Torts, P. 383-384 (1985)

(hospitals

and

psychotherapists

who

have

charge

of

dangerous

patients have a duty to control their charges and to guard other
persons against their charges1 dangerous propensities.

See also

Harper and Kind, The Duty To Control The Conduct Of Another, 43
Yale L.J. 886 (1984).
Under the Restatement approach a duty exists to control and
properly treat a patient even where the patient is deemed to be
"voluntary."

In these instances, the courts impose a standard of

reasonable care to protect victims against the voluntary patient's
acts whenever the psychotherapist has reason to forsee, in accordance with accepted psychiatric standards, that the patient presents an unreasonable risk of serious bodily harm to others.- The
only departure from this rule is made in a limited number of cases
where the assailant is classified as "voluntary," is resistant to

- See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Universty of California,
supra, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (imposing duty to take reasonable
precautions where the assailant was voluntary out-patient);
Mcintosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500 (1979) (psychotherapist responsible for voluntary acts of out-patient); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck
and Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 187 (D. Neb. 1980) (V.A. Hospital
responsible for voluntary out-patient previously in day care
treatment); Bradley Center, Inc., v. Wessner, 296 S.E. 2d 693
(1982) (private mental health hospital owed duty to control
patient upon accepting voluntary admission).
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treatment and has little or no history of violence.-

But even the

cases making the "voluntary patient" distinction recognize that in
certain circumstances, the psychotherapist/ voluntary relationship
will give rise to a duty to protect a third party.—
circumstances

generally

are

based

upon

the

Those

psychotherapist's

ability or right to control the patient, the patient's mental
health and the patient's history of violence.
The recent and well-reasoned decision in Perreira v. State,
768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989) analyzes most of the special relationship cases in this area and indicates they can be understood by
employing a continuum reflecting factual situations with different
levels of control over the patient.
The Perreira Court indicates that at one end of the continuum
are factual situations involving involuntarily committed mentally
ill patients who have violent propensities.

Perreira v. State,

-See, for example, the cases cited by the Appellees in the
Court below. Cooke v. Berlin, 735 P.2d 830 (Ariz. App. 1987) (no
history of violence, not seeking hospitalization and no ability
or opportunity to control conduct); Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp.
1333 (D. Colo. 1983), Aff'd. 751 F.2d 329 (1984) (no history of
violence and not seeking hospitalization); Abernathy v. United
States, 773 F.2d 184, 189 (1985) (no history of violence and not
diagnosed as dangerous); Hasenai v. United States, 541 F. Supp.
999 (D. Md. 1982) (resistant to treatment and hospitalization).
—'Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333 (D. Colo. 1983) (it is
implicit in the majority of cases in this area that the therapist/
patient relationship is one which under certain circumstances will
give rise to a duty on the part of the therapist to protect third
persons from harm); Hasenai v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 999 (D.
Md. 1982) (implicit in the exception to Section 315, however, is
the proposition that such a special relationship must include the
right or ability to control another's conduct).
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supra at 1212. — '

In that instance, where the right and ability

to control the patient is established, a greater duty of care is
imposed.

Perreira v. State, supra at 1213; Naidu v. Laird, supra

at 1064. This case fits within this standard.
"At the mid-point

in the continuum are cases involving a

mentally ill person who voluntarily seeks psychiatric treatment in
a hospital as an in-patient."
in

this

area

impose a duty

Id. at 1211. The majority of cases
to take

reasonable precautions—

including temporary retention or commitment—to protect potential
victims from the patient's violent propensities.

1(3. at 1212.

This is elementary because when a voluntary patient seeks hospitalization for his mental

illness, questions and problems of the

right and ability to control or assess dangerousness evaporate.
Indeed, where a voluntary mentally ill out-patient who has violent
propensities seeks hospitalization, the health care provider "is
under a duty to establish control."
F.

Supp.

999, 1012 N.23

Hasenai v. United States, 541

(D. Md. 1982)

Barbour, 322 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1971).

(citing

Greenburg

v.

This case also fits

within this standard.
On the other end of the continuum is a situation, not present
in this case, where there is a limited right to control a patient

— "Once a mentally ill person has been involuntarily
committed to a mental health facility, the treating psychatrist
has adequate opportunity to learn of the patient's condition,
including any propensity to violence, and the corresponding
ability to prolong the patient's confinement in the interest of
the patient's safety and the safety of others."
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and a limited opportunity to observe the patient's violent pro12/
pensities.
Perreira v. State, supra at 1210.— These cases
usually include voluntary out-patients who refuse hospitalization
and have no prior history of violence.

In those instances, the

duty imposed is correspondingly limited, e.g. a duty to warn when
13/
a specific threat is made against an identifiable victim.—
The cases from the Utah Supreme Court that address liability
of actors for the conduct of another are generally consistent with

— "Because in these cases the therapist is treating the
mentally distubed person as a voluntary out-patient and has
limited opportunity to observe and determine the patient's violent
propensities, and even less opportunity to control the patient's
behavior, some court's have limited the duty to take protective
action to those instances in which the patient makes a specific
threat against a readily identifiable victim, e.g. Thompson v.
County of Alameda. . .; see also Brady v. Hopper. . . . "
13/
— The duty to warn cases have been criticized because
they focus on the wrong issue:
The query as to who might be the appropriate
party to warn in light of a general threat to
the public is, for the most part, a misdirected question.
Specifically, where a
patient's dangerous tendencies are imminent
yet generalized, the only effective resource
for the psychiatrist or psychologist, in most
instances, would be to contact the police in
order to initiate emergency detention proceedings. Society must not become the victim of a
dangerous patient's ambiguity. Stated otherwise: "In some circumstances, when the potential victim is an unidentifiable individual
or group (as in the Lipari case), the only
responsible intervention may be clinical—for
example, hospitalization.
Schuster v. Altenburg, 424 N.W.2d 159, 172-173 (Wis. 1988).
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this analysis.

A negligent actor in Utah may be liable for con-

duct which causes harm to an innocent victim.

Doe v. Arguelles,

716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985) (Corrections Officers liable where released juvenile violently injures fourteen-year-old non-identified
victim); Little v. Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah
1983) (Division of Family Services liable for wrongful death of a
child placed in foster home).
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has recently indicated a
relationship like the one in this case is a "special relationship"
under the Restatement approach.
1187

(Utah

1989) the Court

In Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d

used

the Restatement

approach to

determine the State owed no duty to control a babysitter that
abused a child where there was no meaningful relationship between
the State and the babysitter.

In reaching its conclusion, the

Court found that a more significant relationship was necessary for
duty and cited cases relied upon by the Appellant throughout this
litigation

to

show

the

"special

sufficient to impose duty.

relationship"

in

this

case

Peterson v. State, 671 P.2d 230 (Wash.

1983) (recognizing duty arises out of psychotherapist and mental
health patient relationship); Division of Corrections v. Neakok,
721 P.2d

1121

(Alaska

1987)

(recognizing

special

relationship

between parole officer and parolee).
Appellant asserts that the evidence indicates the right or
ability to control as being uncontestable is this case. First,
Trujillo was in the care of County Mental Health by virtue of
Court-ordered

sentences.

County

Mental
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Health

agreed

to and

assumed a duty to treat Trujillo as the Court ordered and to make
full and accurate reports to probation authorities.
was no question of control.

Thus, there

See Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198,

1213 (Colo. 1989) (involuntary commitment imposes duty); Naidu v.
Laird, 539 A.2d 1064 (Del. 1988) (duty where patient committed).
Second, Trujillo voluntarily sought and requested hospitalization.

She actually relinquished control to County Mental Health

and the Medical Center, who exercised control by referring her to
the emergency room for treatment, evaluating her, referring her to
ARTU, treating her at ARTU, a residential program and sending her
back into the same environment where it was inevitable she would
stab the child about which she had been brooding for six months.
Hasenei v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 999, 1012 n.23

(D. Md.

1982) (duty to establish control); Greenberg v. Barbour, 322 F.
Supp. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
Third, Trujillo was

a Utah

resident

entitled

to receive

mental health services as a patient of a mental health system, in
which Appellees had a critical role, that had the responsibility
to supervise and treat the mentally ill.
(1977).

Utah Code Ann. § 64-7-7

In addition, the Medical Center had the responsibility

under statute to provide emergency services without discriminating
with regard to sex, race or prior inquiry as to the ability to
pay, Utah Code Ann. § 26-8-1 et seq. and the Medical Center had
the duty, as a publicly funded hospital, to provide services to
all persons.

Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C. § 291 et seq.
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Fourth/ County Mental Health and the Medical Center had the
legal right to control Trujillo.

The Utah Mental Health Statutes

in 1984 provided for admission of a voluntary patient for care and
observation.

Section 64-7-29 of the Utah Code Ann, stated that a

"mental health facility

[including by designation County Mental

Health and the Medical Center] . . . may admit for observation,
diagnosis/ care and treatment any individual who is mentally ill
or has symptoms of mental illness. . . .,f

In addition, section

64-7-31 of the Utah Code Ann, provided that the Appellees may
exercise control over a patient to restrict release if conditions
warrant.

The Appellees could even hold a patient who demanded

release for up to forty-eight hours during which time they could
try to persuade the patient to continue in the hospital/ to be
voluntarily

committed/

or

cedures could be commenced.
Neb.

1980)

so that involuntary

commitment pro-

Lipari v. Searsy 497 F. Supp. 185 (D.

(duty to initiate reasonable precautions

including

commitment); Williams v. United Statesf 450 F. Supp. 1040 (D. S.D.
1978) (duty to seek involuntary commitment).—

—'in 1988/ the Utah Legislature passed Utah Code Ann. §
78-14 (a)-101 et. seq. which became effective on April 25/ 1988.
The law provides a "therapist" [as defined] has no duty to warn or
take prevautions for violent behavior of a client/ except where
there is a threat and a reasonably identifiable victim/ which duty
can be discharged by communicating the threat to he victim and law
enforcement agencies. The legislative history of the law indicates it was introduced in a much different form that gave
"therapists" total immunity when a patient injured a victim.
Strong objection and explicit debate narrowed the law so that it
would not apply to a case like this one where professional
standards were breached. [R. at 2296/ 2304-2308/ 2310-2315]. Of
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Thus, there is no question or problem of the Appellees1 right
or ability to control Trujillo.

Accordingly, the duty owed was

one of reasonably care to protect Appellant and her daughter from
the dangers of their mentally ill patient.

The evidence shows the

Appellees

to provide full pro-

breached

this duty by failing

fessional evaluation of Trujillo, by failing to admit her for
treatment, by failing to detain her to be voluntarily committed,
and by failing to detain her for a period to permit involuntary
commitment.

Appellant is now entitled to demonstrate this breach

proximately caused her injury.

See Littleton v. Good Samaritan

Hospital and Health Center, 529 N.E.2d 449, 460 (Ohio 1988); Naidu
v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064 (Del. 1988); Petersen v. State, 671 P.2d
320 (Wash. 1983); Lipari v. Sears, 497 F. Supp. 185, 190 (D. Neb.
1980); Bradley Center, Inc. Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1982);
Mcintosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500, 511 (N.J. 1979).
2.

County Mental Health and the Medical Center as
Psychotherapist/Mental Health Care Providers Owed
Duty to Use Reasonable Care to Take Necessary
Precautions to Protect Kathy and Shaundra Higgins
from Trujillo.

The second

basis the courts have used to impose duty is

founded upon a health care provider's affirmative duty to protect
others,

including

the

general

public,

from

its

patients.

(Cont.) course, the law cannot be applied because the Appellee
institutions are not "therapists" under it and because it would
violate the rule against retroactive application of substantive
law. Stevens v. Hendersen, 741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987).
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Acknowledgement of this basis initially occurred in cases where
patients had infectious or contagious diseases.

Where a health

sare provider negligently fails to diagnose a contagious illness,
or fails to protect the public from an infected person by means of
seclusion or other appropriate steps, the courts have unanimously
recognized a cause of action against the health care provider by
an injured third party who is infected by contact with the contagious patient.

Fosgate v. Corona, 330 A.2d 355

(N.J. 1974)

(failure to diagnose epilepsy that injured person while patient
driving); Tisdale v. Fields, 433 A.2d 212 (N.J.1982); Freeze v.
Lemon, 210 N.W.2d 576 (Iowa 1973) (failure to diagnose epilepsy
that

injured

persons

when

patient

later

had

seizure

while

driving); Hofman v. Blackmon, 241 S.2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1970)

(failure to diagnose tuberculosis); Gooden v. Tipps, 651

S.W.2d

364

(Tex. Ct. App. 1983)

(doctor

prescribing

Quaalude

without caution liable to person injured by patient driving under
the drug's

influence); Warton Transport

S.W.2d

(Tenn. 1980)

521

(trucking

Corp. v. Bridges, 606

company may

sue doctor for

injury arising out of doctor's negligent physical examination of
driver.
Following these holdings, most courts have taken the logical
step of imposing a similar liability on a health care provider who
negligently fails to diagnose, treat or hospitalize mentally ill
patients who have known violent propensities and who, as a result
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of the health care provider's negligence/ injure third parties.—
For instance, in Schuster v. Altenburgy

424 N.W.2d 159 (Wis.

1988) the court faced a fact situation similar to this case.

In

Schuster, the plaintiffs complaint stated a claim for relief based
on a psychotherapist's failure to commit and to properly diagnose
and treat a voluntary patient, including the failure to prescribe
proper medications to the patient and the failure to take reasonable measures to protect members of the public from the patient's
dangerous conduct.

In holding that such a claim is proper, the

Court reasoned:
We can conceive of no reason why a psychiatrist, as a specialist in the practice of
medicine, should not be compelled, as are all
other practitioners, to meet the accepted
standard of care established by other practitioners in the same class.
Id. at 172.

The Schuster Court also noted that the duty imposed

is one of "reasonable care to protect a victim," which care in-

— Salt Lake County, citing the case of Ferree v. State, 784
P.2d 149 (Utah 1989) in the trial court, attempted to invoke the
"public duty" rule to suggest it could not be liable for failing
to perform a breach of duty owed to the general public.
In
Ferree, the Court found corrections officials could not be liable
to a member of the general public particularly where the plaintiff
presented "no evidence" that the released offender had exhibited
violent behavior to another.
(Ic|. at 152). No case in the
country has applied the "public duty" rule to the psychotherapist/
mental patient relationship.
Indeed, one court has recently
indicated the provision of psychiatric care is an exception to the
rule. See e.g., Woodrow v. Benton County, 783 P.2d 1102 (Wash.
App. 1989) (citing Petersen v. State, 671 P.2d 230 (1983) (psychotherapist/patient relationship a special relationship)).
Of
course, the facts show that this stabbing was not committed on a
general member of the public but on a neighbor about whom Trujillo
had been brooding.
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eludes conventional clinical intervention such as reassessment,
medical

charges

or

patient's symptoms.

hospitalization

designed

to

relieve

the

Icl. at 168. The Schuster Court clarified the

scope of the duty defined and stated that "the therapist need only
exercise
possessed

that degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily
by

members

of

[that

profession]

under

similar

circumstances." Id.
Other jurisdictions in cases similar to this one have had no
difficulty holding mental health care providers/hospitals liable
for their negligence in diagnosing and treating violent mental
patients who injure third parties.

See e.g. Clark v. State, 472

N.Y.S.2d 170 (1984) (decision to not hospitalize a mentally ill
patient not founded upon a careful examination of the patient and
the medical record); Jablonski by Pauls v. United States, 712 F.2d
391

(9th Cir. 1983)

(assailant not involuntarily

hospitalized

because physicians negligently failed to obtain and review past
medical records); Mcintosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500, 511-12 (N.J.
1973) (court recognized that hospital had duty to take reasonably
necessary

precautions

to protect

against violence

of an out-

patient treated on weekly basis); Greenburg v. Barbour, 322 F.
Supp. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (failure to act within reasonable time
to admit individual seeking hospitalization). See also Perreira v.
State of Colorado, 769 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989); Naidu v. Laird, 539
A.2d 1064 (Del. 1988); Peterson v. State of Washington, 671 P.2d
230, 237 (1983); Lipari v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 497 F. Supp.
185, 191 (D. Neb. 1980).
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The reasoning in these cases is compelling.
imposed

on

recognized
exercise

the

health

duty owed

that

care provider

The duty that is

is simply

the generally

by a professional practitioner, i.e. "to

reasonable

degree of skill, knowledge, and care

ordinarily possessed and exercised under similar circumstances."
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d at
345, cited in Schuster v. Altenburg, 424 N.W.2d at 164; Mcintosh
v. Milano, 403 A.2d at 511-12.
A psychiatrist is not expected to render a
fool-proof prediction of future violence.
Lipari, 497 F. Supp. at 192. On the contrary,
"ttlhe concept of 'due care1 in appraising
psychiatric
problems,
assuming
proper
procedures are followed, must take account of
the difficulty often inevitable in definitive
diagnosis." Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d
407, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1975). What is required
of the psychiatrist is to exercise that reasonable degree of skill and knowledge ordinarily
possessed
by practicing psychiatrists in
arriving at an informed and realistic assessment of the patient's present condition and
propensity for violence. . . .
Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d at 1217.
This duty of exercising due care is consistently applied by
the Utah Supreme Court which has recognized that public institutions have a duty of care and may be held liable for their
negligent treatment of the mentally ill which results in harm to
the patient or others. In Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah
1980), the Court

refused

to shield the Medical Center from a

wrongful death suit brought by a father alleging the negligence of
a state-employed psychologist

in allowing his son to leave the

hospital, which resulted in his son's suicide.

Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has cited, with approval,
cases imposing similar duties upon health care professionals.
e.g. Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d

475

See

(5th Cir. 1 9 8 2 ) — /

(negligence of mental health care provider is actionable in case
1 7/

resulting in injury to third party); Peterson v. State, supra,—
(holding a state hospital and its psychiatrists responsible for
harm caused by mental patient who voluntarily left the hospital);
Semler v. Psychiatric Institute of Washington D.C., 538 F.2d 121
18/ (psychiatric institute and psychiatrists
(4th Cir. 1976)—
responsible when out-patient killed non-identifiable third party).
The facts in this case reveal that the Appellees failed in
their

duties by, among other things, not reviewing Trujillo's

substantial medical records, not involving qualified personnel in
the

treatment

and

evaluation

of

Trujillo,

not

evaluating

Trujillo's threat of danger to others, not prescribing the proper
medications

to control Trujillo's psychosis and violence, and not

admitting Trujillo to the Medical Center.
3.

County Mental Health Owed Duty to Shaundra and
Kathy Higgins to Properly Treat Trujillo and to
Convey Accurate Information to Probation Authorities
Under Two Court Sentences.
The third basis upon which duty is imposed on County Mental

Health arises out of its role in the criminal justice system and

—''Cited in Little
P.2d 49 (Utah 1983).

v.

Division

of

Family

Services, 667

^ / Cited in Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989).
^Cited
1985).

in

Doe

v.

Arguelles,
- 46 -

716

P.2d

279, 283

(Utah

its acceptance of Trujillo as a patient in accordance with court
orders.
from

The two Courts sentencing Trujillo in 1981, one resulting

Trujillo's

mental

health

prior

stabbing,

treatments

required

through

Trujillo

County

Mental

to

receive

Health.

In

accepting Trujillo as a patientf County Mental Health was aware of
her condition and agreed that she would receive the treatment the
Court deemed necessary.
It
these

is clear

treatments

that
and

County Mental
Trujillo's

violence was not addressed.

Health

condition

did not provide
and

propensity

for

The County Mental Health failure to

insure Trujillo met her probation conditions and received the
necessary care and treatment breached a duty arising from the Court
sentences. See Semler

v. Psychiatric

Institute

of Washington,

D.C., 538 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1976) (psychiatric institute
liable for failing to provide care necessary to mental patient
under sentence requiring that care); Payton v. United States, 679
F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982) (Complaint stated claim against Bureau of
Prisons

for

failing

to

provide

proper

psychiatric

care

for

prisoner/patient).
Likewise, County Mental Health breached an actionable duty
recognized

by

the

courts

sentencing

authorities.

to

convey

The Court

accurate

information

to

records indicate that even

though Trujillo did not meet these probation conditions, County
Mental Health falsely advised probation authorities that she had
done so.
- 47 -

Hicks v, United States, 511 F.2d 407, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1975) is
on point.

In that case, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death

action seeking damages for the death of a patient's wife, who was
shot by her husband after he was discharged from a government
hospital.

The hospital in Hicks, like County Mental Health here,

was aware of the patient's

violent psychological

record but

failed to properly represent the record in a letter to the Court.
The assailant was released on the basis of the hospital's letter
and later killed his wife.
In affirming

the

judgment

entered

for the plaintiff, the

Court of Appeals held that the hospital, in exercising due care,
had the responsibility

to accurately advise the Court and was

"negligent" when it did not do so.

1(3. at 418.

County Mental Health had the responsibility

to accurately

advise probation authorities about Trujillo, her abysmal compliance with court-ordered mental health treatments and her propensity for violence when she was placed into an unstructured setting.
They

failed

to

fulfill

this

responsibility

resulting

in the

termination of her probation with no constraints on Trujillo and
the placement

of Trujillo

in the environment

inevitably become psychotic and violent.

where

she would

Shaundra Higgins now has

a claim based on County Mental Health's breach of duty in not
treating Trujillo in accordance with her probation conditions and
in not properly advising probation authorities about her.
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C.

THE RULING BELOW VIOLATES THE OPEN COURTS PROVISION
THE DOE PROCESS AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES
OF THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS.

To rule that no duty was owed under the circumstances of this
case, as the lower court did, violates the Open Courts Provision
of the Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 11, and the due
process and equal protection guarantees of the
States

Constitutions, U.S. Constitutional

Utah and United

Amendment

XIV, Utah

Constitution, Article 1, Section 7, Utah Constitution, Article 1,
Section 24.
The lower court's ruling effectively denies Appellant access
to

the

judicial

effectively

process

eliminates

without

"remedies

meaningful
designed

alternatives
to

protect

individual rights without sufficient justification."

and

basic

Berry by

and Through Berry v. Beach Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985).
This violates Utah's Open Courts Provision found at Section 11 of
the

Constitution's

Declaration

of

Rights

which

"specifically

guarantees a remedy by due course of law for injuries to a person,
property or reputation."

Berry at 675.

Furthermore, the lower courts' order violates the due process
guarantees of the Utah Constitution applicable under the Open
Courts Provision because the Appellant's right to recover for
personal injuries is a substantive right that is guaranteed by
Article 1, Section 11, Condemarin v. The University Hospital, 775
P.2d 348 (Utah 1989).

This is particularly true because there is

no meaningful alternative allowed to seek redress for injury and
- 49 -

the ruling favors psychotherapists/mental health care providers'
economic

interest

in avoiding

liability

interest in recovering damages.

over

the

Appellant's

Sun Valley Water Beds v. Hughes &

Sons, 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 1989).
Finally, the ruling below violates equal protection guaratees
by unconstitutionally treating persons in the same class differently.

First, the ruling discriminates between victims who are

injured by health care providers who breached accepted standards
of care.

Second, the ruling discriminates by making a certain

group of professionals immune from suit despite their departure of
standards

of

care.

See

e.g.

Condamerin

v.

The

University

Hospital, supra, (Stewart, J.).
CONCLUSION
Appellant and her daughter submit that County Mental Health
and the Medical Center owed them the duty of controlling and
properly treating their dangerous and mentally ill patient and
respectfully request the Court reverse the summary judgments and
remand this case for trial.
DATED this

STOKER & THOMAS

3

day of December, 1990.

CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW

James L. Warlaumont
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Dr. Louis A. Moench states as follows:
1.

I am

a general

and

practice in the State of Utah.
in this community

forensic psychiatrist

licensed

to

I am aware of the standard of care

for evaluating and treating

the mentally ill

with violent propensities.
2.

I have reviewed a large volume of documents outlining the

psychiatric, treatment, and criminal history of Caroline Trujillo
as it relates to the stabbing of Shaundra Higgins.
I have

reviewed

the evaluation

and

treatment

In particular,

records from the

University of Utah, where Ms. Trujillo was seen in the emergency
room and hospitalized on four occasions; trie Utah State Hospital,
where Ms. Trujillo was hospitalized three times; and, Salt Lake
County Mental Heath, where Ms. Trujillo was evaluated and treated
individually and in residential placement at various times from
1976

through

1984.

I have

also

reviewed

the

depositions

of

William Kuentzel, M.D., Joy Ely, M.D., Sheryl Steadman, R.N., Katy
Jones, R.N., Lynn Whitaker and Larry Romero.
3.

Based on my review of the record and the depositions, the

defendants in this case should have known, by a proper evaluation
and diagnosis of Caroline Trujillo, that there was an unacceptably

EXHIBIT 1A

high

level

of

risk

that Caroline

Trujillo at the time of the

stabbing would act violently towards herself or others.

Specifi-

cally, the records set forth above indicate:
a.
diagnosed

Caroline
as

Trujillo,

having

a

major

since
mental

her

teens,

illness,

had

been

schizophrenia,

paranoid type, as well as organic brain dysfunction, and marginal
intelligence.

In addition, her behavior

fit

in a category of

anti-social personality disorder.
b.

Ms. Trujillo had been described

in the records by

psychiatrists as hostile, dangerous, having an explosive personality

disorder, disorganized

in her

behavior, confused

in her

thoughts, inappropriate in her mood, lacking insight into a need
for medication, and lacking any commitment to self-therapeutic or
self-betterment goals.

Psychotic symptoms were prevalent near the

time of the stabbing, including hallucinations of voices derogating herself, halluciations telling her to narm herself, and paranoid delusions.
c.

Unlike most schizophrenics, Caroline Trujillo had a

substantial history of violent behavior.
someone

needing

episodes

of

stabbing.

extra

random

attention

assaults

on

and

This set her apart as

precautions.

strangers,

There

including

a

were
prior

There were many episodes of assaults on patients and

staff, during prior hospitalizations, necessitating seclusion and
restraint.

-2-

d.

Caroline Trujillo1s

to the features

of

her mental

assaultiveness was attributable
illness and not merely

to "bad

acting" of a voluntary nature.
e.
in

When medication in proper type and dosage was given

conjunction

psychosis

were

diminished.
Trujillo's

with

an

markedly

inpatient
reduced

environment
and

propensities

In the several months prior
medication

and

her

environment

symptoms of
for

violence

to the stabbing, Ms.

were

not

sufficient

to

control her psychotic symptoms and her propensity for violence.
f.
Shaundra

For

at

least

Higgins, Caroline

psychotic

relapse

as

four

months

Trujillo

indicated

before

displayed

by:

(i)

The

the

stabbing

obvious

of

signs of

persistence

of

auditory hallucinations; (ii) aberrant behavior/ including selfharmful acts; (iii) confusion and thought disturbances; and, (iv)
erratic use of medications and failure to appreciate her need for
them*
4.

The defendants should have known that Caroline Trujillo

posed an unacceptably high level of risk of bodily harm to others,
which risk was not properly assessed and treated because:
a.

The crisis nurse at the emergency room did not review

records which would have alerted her that Caroline Trujillo was a
paranoid schizophrenic with organic brain damage and a history of
violence due to her illness and had required involuntary hospitalization four times.

-3-

b.

The crisis nurse misdiagnosed

"depressed" and suffering

from an

Caroline Trujillo as

"affective disorder," a con-

clusion she should not have reached had she reviewed the records,
or more carefully evaluated Miss Trujillo.
c.

The crisis nurse failed to properly interview avail-

able family members about Caroline Trujillo and her history.
d.

The

crisis

nurse

failed

to

inquire

as

to

prior

history of violence.
e.

The

crisis

nurse

failed

to

consult

with

the

psychiatric resident on call.
f.
Trujillo
minimally

The

to

crisis

the

Adult

therapeutic

nurse

improperly

Residential
setting

Treatment

without

referred
Unit

adequately

Caroline

("ARTU"), a
qualified

or

sufficiently available staff to treat her illness at that time.
g.

No record was made of any consxderation or evaluation

at the hospital or ARTU as to Miss Trujillo's potential for repeating past violence.
h.
intervention.

There was little evidence of meaningful psychiatric
A psychiatric

resident or physician was not in-

volved at the emergency room, and Dr. Joy Ely's role at the ARTU
Unit was very limited.

There is no indication that Dr. Ely partici-

pated in a treatment plan beyond the prescribing of medication and
Joy Ely indicated that Salt Lake County Mental Health would not
allow her to do more than that.

-4-

i.

The responsible physician

Salt Lake County

Mental

for Caroline Trujillo at

Health, Dr. William Kuentzel, did not

examine Ms. Trujillo in 1984.

The record shows Dr. Kuentzel had

only one psychiatric evaluation in the seven years of treatment of
Caroline Trujillo at Salt Lake County Mental Health.

This is so

even though Dr. Kuentzel authorized antipsychotic medications for
much

of

intervals

this period.

Psychiatric

are considered

necessary

evaluations
by

at

three month

the Joint Task

Force on

Community Psychiatry of the National Council of Community Mental
Health Centers and the American Association of Community Psychiatrists in Association with Committees of the American Psychiatric
Association, especially for the severely mentally ill, to monitor
the efficacy of, tolerance to, and need

for medication, and to

supervise the formulation and modification of treatment plans.
j.

Likewise,

psychotropic

prescription, including
psychiatrist.

medication

evaluation

dosage changes, must be performed

Medication

decisions

for

Caroline

and
by a

Trujillo were

mostly made by Sheryl Steadman, who lacked the qualifications or
experience necessary.
k.

Despite the recommendations by a psychiatrist at ARTU

that Caroline Trujillo's medications be increased to control her
symptoms, it does not appear that increases were administered.
1.
was

paid

behavior

to

There is little recorded evidence that any attention
evaluating

through

County

or

diffusing

Mental

ARTU.
-5-

propensities

Health, and

for

violent

especially

through

m.

The treatment plan for Caroline Trujillo developed at

ARTU was not sufficient because it included mainly elements with
which Caroline had not complied

in the past and family therapy

which never occurred.
n.

Larry

Romero,

who

was

principally

assigned

to

Caroline Trujillo at ARTU, had no experience with Ms. Trujillo and
was

not qualified

to devise a treatment

schizophrenic, actively psychotic patient.

plan

for

a suicidal,

Sheryl Steadman, who

knew Ms. Trujillo, was involved inadequately in her disposition
and treatment at ARTU and made no change in the treatment plan
after discharge to respond to her intensified distress.
o.

Caroline Trujillo was a known abuser of heroin and

amphetamines.

There was a failure to deal seriously with sub-

stance abuse in her treatment and there were no serious attempts
to

intervene

contributed

in
to

her

her

drug

paranoid

use

though

psychosis.

amphetamines
On

the

may

day

of

have
the

stabbing, it is reported that Caroline Trujillo smoked marijuana.
Therefore, abuse was apparently still occurring.
5.

There is clear evidence that Caroline Trujillo gradually

improved when psychotic relapses were treated by a highly structured, inpatient hospital setting, with an increase in her antipsychotic medications.

At the time of the stabbing, her medication

dose was materially less than that most recently recommended by a

-6-

psychiatrist to control her symptoms.

In light of her psychotic

statef the low dosage of medications was not sufficient to control
her violence.
6.

In my opinion, the minimum standard of care for Caroline

Trujillo, given the psychotic symptoms she displayed on February
25,

1984f

and

her

past

history

of

violence

required inpatient psychiatric treatment.
response

to

extended

inpatient

when

psychotic,

Past history of gradual

treatment

indicates

that

her

psychosis would have been better controlled and risk for violent
behavior significantly reduced had she been hospitalized.
DATED this

1^

day of

^eph>mbec

1989.

Louis A. Moench, M/.D.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
1989.

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:

Residing at:

/sT day of QspfeiiUc- /
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Dr. Manya Attiya states as follows:
1.

I am a psychiatrist licensed to practice in the State of

Utah and have been since 1972.
2.

I was employed

as a psychiatrist for Salt Lake County

Mental Health for the years 1981 through 1985.
3.

As part

of my duties as a psychiatrist

for Salt Lake

County Mental Health I worked in the Salt Lake County Jail.
assessed, evaluated and diagnosed

I

the mentally ill with violent

propensities.
4.
for

the

I have served as a psychiatrist in many civil proceedings
involuntary

hospitalization

of

individuals

who

were

mentally ill and posed an immediate danger to themselves or others
or needed custodial care or treatment.
5.

As

a

staff

Health, I assessed

psychiatrist
and evaluated

after two separate stabbings.

for

Lake

County

Mental

Caroline Trujillo in the jail

The first occasion occurred in 1981

after Caroline Trujillo had stabbed
assessed and evaluated

Salt

a senior

citizen.

I also

Caroline Trujillo in 1984 after she had

stabbed Shaundra Higgins.

EXHIBIT I B

6.
and

I have reviewed my progress notes from these assessments

evaluations

and

I have

reviewed

documents

arising

out

of

Caroline Trujillo*s emergency room visit at the University of Utah
Medical Center on February 25, 1984 and subsequent treatment at
the Adult Residential Treatment Unit.
7.

Based on my review of these documents and my evaluations

and assessments of Caroline Trujillo, my opinion is that Caroline
Trujillo

was

mentally

ill, dangerous

and

in need

of care and

treatment in an in-patient hospital setting in February, March and
April of 1984.

My assessments and evaluations and the records I

have reviewed indicate:
a.

Caroline

illness,

paranoid

Trujillo

suffered

schizophrenia

and

from

a major

was

mental

intellectually

impaired.
b.

Caroline

Trujillo

was

openly

history of psychotic behavior.
when

pushed

or

bothered

and

hostile

and

had

a

She acted out aggressively
required

isolation

cells

to

protect her from hurting others or from being hurt.
c.

Psychotic symptoms were present at the time of both

stabbings.

In particular, in 1984, Caroline responded to a

voice telling her to stab someone to feel better.

She was

unable to control her thoughts at this time and had no idea
why she acted out violently.
8.
March

of

The

records

1984,

the

further
symptoms

indicate
of
-2-

that

psychosis

during
that

February and
made

Caroline

Trujillo dangerous were present*
sistence

of

auditory

herself and insisting
use.

The

hallucinations

records

indicate a per-

instructing

she must die, despite

her

to

harm

regular medication

Her thought processes were confused and there are reported

hallucinations
inflicted

and

delusions.

lacerations

and

There

bruises

impaired insight and judgment.

are

with

a

references

to

self-

suspicious

mood

and

There is a continuation of suicide

ideation and hostility even though placed in a residential treatment setting.
9.

Further, Caroline Trujillo in 1984, had a past behavior

that included violence and a prior stabbing.

Caroline Trujillo,

on the basis of this past behavior and on the basis of the presentment of violent behavior secondary to psychotic symptoms, required
in-patient hospitalization, and no less restrictive

environment

was appropriate, including a residential placement at the Adult
Residential Treatment Unit.

ARTU was not sufficient to evaluate

and assess Caroline Trujillo and her propensity for violence and
properly

treat

Caroline

Trujillo

and

did

not

properly

treat

Caroline Trujillo.
9.
strated

Furthermore, my examinations of Caroline Trujillo demonthat

Caroline

Trujillo

gradually

improved

when

her

psychosis was treated by a highly-structured, in-patient hospital
settingr with strict attention to anti-psychotic medications being
paid.

For

instance,

in 1981, the

records

reflect

that after

Caroline Trujillo was hospitalized at the Utah State Hospital for
-3-

approximately three months, her hostility and psychosis gradually
improved.
the

Dtah

Likewise, in 1984 after eight and one-half months in
State

Hospital,

Caroline

Trujillo1s

violent

thoughts

improved.
10.

Accordingly/ in my opinion, the minimum standard of care

for Caroline Trujillo, given the psychotic symptoms she displayed
in February and March of 1984, and her past history of violence
when psychotic, required extended in-patient psychiatric treatment
for at least ninety days.

The records

indicate that Caroline

Trujillo sought in-patient hospital treatment; thus, involuntary
hospitalization

was not necessary. In the event, however, that

Caroline Trujillo opposed in-patient treatment, there was a substantial basis to initiate involuntary hospitalization procedures.
Past history of gradual response to extended in-patient treatment
indicates

that

Caroline

Trujillo1s

psychosis

would

have

been

better controlled in this manner and it is unlikely this stabbing
would have occurred had she been hospitalized.
DATED this /&

day of August, 1989.

Manya Att^ya, M/D.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this x^L—" d a y
1989.

of

August,
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drugs

1.

I am the natural mother of Caroline Trujillo.

2.

Caroline began to use drugs in her early teens.

made

Caroline

uncontrollable

and

caused

Caroline

The
to be

hostile and act out.
3.

Caroline was first hospitalized in 1975 for her mental

illness at the University of Utah.

I was told by doctors at that

time that the drugs Caroline

taken had damaged

had

Caroline's

brain and had made her a schizophrenic.
4.

Caroline's behavior since her early teens has been unpre-

dictable, and at times dangerous.
hysterically for no reason.

She would often cry or scream

She heard voices that would tell her

to hurt herself and make her act out.
5.

Caroline was involved in numerous violent and unpredict-

able incidents over the years.
wrists and almost killed herself.
6.

Caroline impulsively slashed her
She stabbed an elderly woman.

Caroline was either in jail, hospitalized, on the street,

or living with me from the time she was fourteen.

When she lived

with me, she would disappear for long periods of time and would
then reappear in a battered condition.
about her.

I was always very worried

I had nightmares that Caroline would be left dead on

FYHinrr A

our porch as a result of the fights and beatings that occurred.
On one occasion when Caroline disappeared, I received a call from a
young woman demanding monies because Caroline had stabbed her.
This was an incident different from the other stabbings.
7.

Caroline did not understand her illness.

She would not

take medications that were prescribed unless someone made her and
made sure she took them when she was supposed to. Caroline was not
capable of attending therapy sessions set up for her.
could not and never did hold a job.

Caroline

Caroline could not care for

herself or the two children that were born to her.

The two chil-

dren were taken from her and were adopted because Caroline could
not care for them.

When Caroline lived with us, we could not leave

her at home with our other children because of the danger she
presented.
8.

Caroline

suffered

from

hallucinations

and delusions.

These hallucinations made her act in a bizarre way.

She would

violently hit herself, scream in terror and bang her head against
the wall.

She did this even though she took the medications that

were given to her.
9.

The medications did not seem to help.

My husband and I tried over and over to get long-term

inpatient treatment for Caroline.

It seemed that for Caroline to

get treatment, she had to be picked up by the police.

Caroline

was hospitalized at the University of Utah in 1975 when she told
the police that my husband and I were trying to kill her brothers
and sisters.

Caroline was hospitalized in 1978 after she left her

-2

ten-day-old daughter at Holy Cross Hospital and did not tell the
Hospital who she was.
broken neck.

At the time Caroline claimed the baby had a

Just after this, Caroline was sent to the State

Hospital at my request.

Caroline was arrested for stabbing an

elderly lady in 1981 and was sent to the State Hospital for a
second time.
10.

I signed commitment papers in an effort to have Caroline

hospitalized for an extended period, but Caroline was never placed
in the hospital for a sufficient time period to help her.

It

seemed the hospitals would always let her out even though she was
not better and was still acting out.
11.

At the time, I was very angry that I could not get my

daughter hospitalized.

Once I went to the Sugarhouse unit of

Salt Lake County Mental Health and demanded Caroline be hospitalized.

I was told that I would have to talk to someone else.

On

several occasions I angrily had words with Sheryl Steadman and
demanded that Caroline be hospitalized.
12.
buck.

Sheryl Steadman and the other people always passed the
They continually

referred rae to someone else who would

refer me to another person.

The result was that Caroline did not

receive the long-term hospitalization that she needed.
13.

My husband and I again requested that Caroline be hospital-

ized in February of 1984,

Caroline slashed her wrists at that time

with disposable razors we kept at home. We kept those type of razors
so that Caroline could not kill herself.

3-

I took Caroline to the

University Hospital in order to get her cuts fixed so there would
be

no

infection.

I specifically

requested

that

Caroline

be

hospitalized for her mental illness.
14.
room.

Caroline and I met with a crisis worker in the emergency

I told the crisis worker that:
(a).

Caroline had been hallucinating and was experiencing delusions;

(b) . The hallucinations and delusions caused Caroline
to act out in a dangerous way, and resulted in her
beating her head, hitting her chest and cutting
herself;
(c) . The medications that Caroline was taking did not
control her or stop her from acting out.
15.

I specifically requested that Caroline be hospitalized as

an inpatient.

The crisis worker told me that there were no beds

available at that time.

I felt that the crisis worker did not

really care about my daughter and was indifferent about her problems.

I could not believe that this big hospital did not have any

beds for my ill daughter.
16.

The crisis worker referred me to a group home called

ARTD that was operated by Salt Lake County and told me Caroline
could come back

to the University

when a bed was available.

Caroline had been in the group home before and I did not feel it
would help her since it had not helped her in the past and since
it was apparent Caroline could not follow the rules of a group

4-

home.

But my husband and I could not afford to place Caroline in a

private hospital. We had no alternative and took her to the group
home until she could be transferred to the University Hospital at
the time a bed became available.
17.

We told the crisis worker at the group home that we

understood Caroline would be hospitalized at the University of Utah
when a bed became available.

We also told the worker that Caroline

had a long-term mental illness and had been in trouble with the
police

in the past.

hallucinations

and

We explained

delusions,

and

that Caroline suffered
we were

concerned

from

she would

attempt suicide.
18.

Even though we were told and requested that Caroline

would be hospitalized, she never was.

Caroline spent several days

at the group home and was then sent home.

At the time Caroline was

picked up, we did not believe we could handle Caroline and told the
persons

at

the

group

home.

We

also

told

the

people

that

Caroline's hallucinations, delusions and violence would continue.
It was clear to me and clear to the people at the group home that
Caroline could not follow through with outpatient

treatments.

Since Caroline had no place to go, she came back into our home.
19. Caroline continued to have problems after she came home.
Someone arranged for a job for her as a dishwasher, which Caroline
immediately quit because she could not handle it.
the dishes were talking to her.

Caroline claimed

We picked her up when she quit

and she was hysterically crying. A few days later, Caroline stabbed
Shaundra Higgins.
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20*
the

Carolyn was mentally ill at the time she was taken to

University

Hospital, the

stabbed Shaundra Higgins.

group

home and

at

the

time

she

She was totally unable to provide the

necessities of life, including food, clothing and shelter.

She

had to be followed to make sure she took her medications.

She

could not weigh the costs and benefits of treatment.

A J (Ul'L.-lA

A//66y>2^^

'Rebecca Navarro

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s
1988.

NOTARY PGfiLIC
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:

J£f-

/Z

day of May,
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A F F I D A V I T

STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
1.

I am the step-father of Caroline Trujillo and have been

since she was two years old.
2.
old.

Caroline began to use drugs when she was fourteen years

The drugs made Caroline uncontrollable and caused Caroline

to be hostile and act out.
3.
in 1975.

Caroline was first hospitalized at the University of Utah
At that time, she claimed that my wife and I had killed

our other children.

I was told the doctors at that time indicated

that the drugs Caroline had taken had damage J Caroline's brain and
had made her a schizophrenic.
4.
able

Caroline was involved in numerous violent and unpredict-

incidents

over

the

years.

On

one

occasion,

Caroline

impulsively slashed her wrists after I confronted her about drugs.
On another, she stabbed an elderly woman.

Once I had to go to

Elko, Nevada to pick her up after a doctor called.

Apparently she

became uncontrollable while in a casino.
5.

Caroline was either in jail, hospitalized, on the street

or living with me from the age of fourteen.

When she lived with

me, she would disappear for long periods of time and would then
reappear in a battered condition.

FYUItBT

V.

6.

Caroline did not understand her illness.

She would not

take medications that were prescribed for her unless someone made
her.

She was not capable of attending therapy sessions set up for

her.

She could not hold a job and could not care for herself and

two children that were born to her.

The two children were taken

from her and were adopted because Caroline could not care for them.
When Caroline lived with me and my wifef we could not leave her at
home with our other children because of the danger she presented.
7.

Caroline suffered from hullcinations and delusions that

made her act very strange.

She would hear voices that would tell

her to hurt herself and others.

She would violently hit herself,

scream in terror and bang her head against the wall.
8.

My

wife

and

I tried

over

inpatient treatment for Caroline.

and

over

to

get

long-term

The only times that Caroline

would be placed into an inpatient treatment program was when she
had trouble with the police.

On these occasions, Caroline was

never placed in the hospital for a sufficient time period to help
her.

The hospitals would always let her out even though she was

not better and was still acting out.
9.

In February of 1984 Caroline slashed her wrists.

I took

Caroline with my wife to an adult residential treatment unit after
my wife had tried to have Caroline hospitalized at the University
of Utah.
10.

At the adult residential treatment unit, we met with a

crisis worker.

We told the crisis worker it was our understanding
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that Caroline would be allowed to go to the University when a bed
was available.

Caroline had been in the group home before and I

did not feel it would help her because it had not helped her in
the past, and because Caroline could not follow the rules of the
group home.
hospital.

But we could not afford to place Caroline in a private
We had no alternative but to take her to the group home

until she would be transferred to the University at the time a bed
became available.
11.

Caroline was never sent to the University Hospital.

She

spent several days at the group home and then was sent to our
home.

I advised the person at the group home that I was reluctant

to take Caroline back because I did not feel her hallucinationsf
delusions and violence would stop and that she would still create
problems for our family.

But Caroline had no other place to go, so

we took her back into our home.
12.

After she came home, Caroline continued to have problems.

She continued
night.

to beat herself and scream

in the middle of the

She took a job as a dishwasher and quit.

and she cried hysterically.

I picked her up

Not long after she came home, Caroline

stabbed Shaundra Higgins.
13.

I believe that Caroline was mentally ill at the time we

took Caroline to the adult residential treatment unit and at the
time she stabbed Shaundra Higgins. She was and had been totally
unable

to

provide

the

clothing and shelter.

necessities

of

life,

including

food,

We had to follow her to make sure she took

-3-

her medications.

She did not understand the nature of her illness

and could not weigh the costs and^benefits of treatment.
/

Richard Navarro

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
1988.

NOTARVPUBLIC
Residing at

My Commission Expires:

M-

f May,

TabE

AFFIDAVIT OF DOROTHY CANDELARIA

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
1.

I am an aunt of Caroline Trujillo.

2.

I am a nurse and have been employed on a psychiatric ward

at Pioneer Valley Hospital since 1983.
3.

As

the

aunt

of

Caroline

Trujillo,

I

have

personal

knowledge of her mental illness, her hostile and violent nature
and

the efforts

undertaken

by

her

family

to obtain

long-term

institutionalized care for Caroline.
4.

After she first cut her wrists and attempted suicide,

Caroline showed schizophrenic behaviors.

She attempted suicide

after police told her that her habitual drug use was addictive.
As a result of her severe mental illness, Caroline was treated by
Salt Lake County, through its Division of Mental Health, and the
University of Utah.
commitments.
(a)

At times the care was due to involuntary

During the periods she was treated:
Caroline engaged in self-mutilation and abuse,
including suicide attempts.

(b)

Caroline assaulted and fought with other persons.

(c)

Caroline would leave home for long periods and would
unexpectedly

return with cuts, bruises and other

wounds.
(d)

Caroline could not care for herself or her children
who were eventually taken from her because Caroline
could not care for them.
f\#i nrviT

f\

4.

Caroline

did

not

have

insight

into

her

illness

or

understand it*
5.

Caroline's history of acting out and violence resulted in

her mother
long-term

and step-father
care

trying

for Caroline.

on many occasions to obtain

Despite

their efforts, the only

long-term treatment Caroline received was medication administered
by Salt Lake County Mental Health.

The medication was not enough

to control Caroline and did not help Caroline.
6.

In

1984f

before

and

at

the

time

of

the

stabbing

of

Shaundra Higgins, Caroline was predisposed to violent behavior and
was dangerous.

The slashing of her wrists in February of 1984 was

an indication of her violence and dangerousness.
7.

In February of 1984 and at the time she stabbed Shaundra

Higgins, Caroline was dangerous to herself and others.

She was

unable to provide the basic necessities of life, such as foodf
clothing

and shelter, and she lacked the ability

to engage in

decision making regarding the acceptance of mental treatment.

Dorothy Candelaria
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
c ->-?<-*

^

day of Mayf 1988.
-V

. < ^ -

NOTARY PUBLIC
, , > _ ' ' /
,7
R e s i d i n g a t ; •^_.^ > C .'zl<<2< Lczs-rr

My Commission Expires:
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DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
3y: PATRICIA J~ MARLOWE, #2084
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State, --S3400
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 34190-1200
Telephone: :801) 468-3421

.—vC/.V^- v , : W C U A '

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KATHY LYNN HIGGINS,
Plaintiff,

:
:

JUDGMENT AND ORDER

\

Civil Ho. 34-4921PI

:
:

Judge James S. Sawaya

vs
CAROLINE TRUJILLO, et ai.,
Defendants.

Defendants Salt Lake County, William Kuentzei and Sheryl
Steadman's Motion
hearing

before-

for Summary Judgment came on regularly for

the

Court,

the

Honorable

James

District Court Juage, presio^ng, on Karen 26, 19&0.
were representea

by their

S.

Sawaya,

Plamtifrs

attorneys, James 1. Wariaumont and

David B. Thomas; defenaants University of Utah and University
cf Utah Hospita± were representea by their attorney, Druce K.
Jensen, and defendants Salt Lake County, William Kuentzei and
Sheryl Steaaman were represented by their attorney, Patricia J.
Marlowe, Deputy Salt LaKe County Attorney.

The Court heard the

arcuments of counsel and took the matter under advisement.

The

Court

having

reviewed

the

memoranda

filed

by

the

parties, having heard and considered the arguments of counsel,
and being fully advised in the premises, and having previously
issued its Minute Order granting summary judgment to defendants
Salt Lake County, William Kuentzei and Sheryl Steaaman for the
reasons that these defendants owed no duty to the plaintiffs,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that

judgment

is

entered

in

favor

of

defendants

County, William Kuentzei and Sheryl Steatiman.

Salt

Lake

The Court find-

ing no reason for delay, directs the entry of Judgment against
the

plaintiffs

and

in

favor

of

Salt

Lake

County,

William

Kuentzei and Sheryl Steadman, in accordance with Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, 54(b).
DATED this ,••- ^

day of April, 1990.
BY THE COURT:.

JAMES S. SAWAYA
Third District Courz Juoge

. .57T:CT COURT. SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE '\?

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify thai: ± caused a true and correct copy of
JUDGMENT AND ORDER to be nailed, postage prepaid thereon, this
"3-ay of April, 1990 to the rollowing:
James L. Warlaumont, Esq,
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW
200 American Savings Plaza
77 West 200 South
Salt LaKe City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
David E. Thomas, Esq.
STOKER & THOMAS
311 South State Street, #440
Salt Lake City, Utan 34111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Bruce H. Jensen
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
#10 Exchange Place
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for University of Utah and
University of Utah Hospital

TabG

BRUCE H. JENSEN (A1667)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN a MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants
University of Utah and
University Hospital
13 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah S4145
Telephone: (601) 521-9000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KATHY LYNN HIGGINS,
individually and as
Guardian ad Litem for
SHAUNDRA HIGGINS,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
MEDICAL CENTER and JOHN
FOES 1 through 10,

Civil No. C84-4 921
Judge James s. Sawaya

Defendants.
The Motion for Summary Judgment: of defendants University of
Utah and University Hospital (incorrectly identified as The
University Medical Center) came on regularly for decision before
the above-entitled Court, pursuant to Rule 4-501, Rules of
Judicial Administration.
The Court, being fully advised m

the premises

having

reviewed the pleadings, memoranda and discovery materials on file
herein, having ordered publication cf all discovery depositions
taken m

this matter, and having heard the arguments of counsel

for the parries after granting plaintiff's Request for oral
Argument, hereby grants defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
on the ground and for the reason that the Court finds these
defendants owed no duty to these particular plaintiffs under the
circumstances of this case.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Summary

Judgment is entered in favor cf defendants University of Utah and
University Hospital and against plaintiff upon plaintiff's
Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint, no cause of
action.

The Court, finding no just reason for delay, directs the

entry of Judgment against the plaintiff and in favor of the
University of Utah and University Hospital in accordance with
Utah Rules of civil Procedure, Rule 54(b).
DATED this

/"• day of

/ -' - ''• '.

r

1990.

3Y THE COURT:

JAMES S. 5AWAYA, District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:
STOKER & THOMAS

3y:
DAVID B. THOMAS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
•,5\BHJY:M83.:::\S.J

2

CERTIFICATE 0? SERVICE
I hereby certify that ± causeo a urue and correct copy of
'DGMENT AND ORDER to be mailed, postage prepaid thereon, chis
'day of April, 1990 to the following:
James L. Warlaumont, Esq.
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW
200 American Savings Plaza
77 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 34101
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Lavic E. Thomas, Esc.
STOKER <k THOMAS
211 Soutn State Street, #440
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Bruce H. Jensen
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
#10 Exchange Place
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for University of Utah and
University of Utah Hospital
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RODNEY G. SNOW (3 028)
NEIL A. KAPLAN (3974)
JAMES L. WARLAUMONT (3386)
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW
Attorneys for Plaintiff
200 American Savings Plaza
77 West 200 South
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-2516
STEPHEN G. STOKER (3122)
DAVID B. THOMAS (3 218)
STOKER & THOMAS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
211 South State Street, Suite 440
Salt Lake Citv, Utan 34111
Telephone: .801) 359-4000

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KATHY LYNN HIGGINS, individually :
and as Guardian ad Litem for
:
SHAUNDRA HIGGINS,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
vs.

AMENDED NOTICE
OF APPEAL

:
Civil No. 34-4921

SALT LAKE COUNTY, WILLIAM
KUENTZEL, SHERYL STEADMAN,
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, THE
UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER,
CAROLINE TURJILLO AND JOHN
DOES I througn 10,
Defendants.

:
:
:

Judge James S. Sawaya

:
:
:

The Plaintiff Kathy Higgms, individually and as guardian
ad litem for her daughter Shaundra Higgms, pursuant to Rule

3(a) of

the

Utah

Rules

of Appellate

Procedure, appeals the

following summary judgments entered by the Honoraole James S.
Sawaya, Third

District

Court

Judge

pursuant

to Rule

54(b) ,

U.R.C.P., in the above entitled action:
1.

The April

defendants

Salt

23, 1990 Judgment

Lake

County,

and Order

William

Kuentzel

finding
and

the

Sheryl

Steadman owed no duty to Plaintiff or her daughter, Shaundra.
2.

The

April

23,

1990

Summary

Judgment

finding

the

defendant University of Utah and University Medical Center owed
no duty to Plaintiff or her daughter, Shaundra.
DATED this

, , ^

day of May, 1990.
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW

Rodney G. Snow
Neil A. Kaplan
James L. Warlaumont
STOKER & THOMAS

Stepnen B. Stoker
David B. Thomas

^^

Attorneys for Plaintiff Kathy Lynn
Higgms, individually ana as guardian
ad litem for Shaundra Hiqams

3c S N O W
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of NOTICE OF APPEAL
this

to be mailed, postage

prepaid

M 3- day of Mayf 1990 to the following:
Patricia J. Marlowe, Esq.
Assistant Salt Lake County
Attorney
2001 South State Street
Room #S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Attorneys for Steadman,
Kuentzel and Salt Lake County
Bruce H. Jensen, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
1100 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for University
Medical Center

2-

_Y2E. P°ATT
& SNOW
*5S O N * . C;«»o»i'
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thereon,
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64-7-7. Supervision and treatment of mentally ill person,
by division.
TKe DWi.cn of Mental HeaUh * » » » ^

—

£

3 S S £

elsewhere.

64-7-29. Admission of voluntary patient for observation or
care — Age of patient.
The superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or director of a mental
health facility or either of their designees may admit for observation, diagnosis, care, and treatment any individual who is mentally ill or has symptoms of
mental illness and who, being sixteen years of age or over, applies therefor,
and any individual under sixteen years of age who is mentally ill or has
symptoms of mental illness, if his parent or legal guardian applies therefor in
his behalf.
No person over sixteen years of age may be hospitalized or continue to be
hospitalized against his will, except as provided in this chapter.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMEND. XIV, § 5

AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Section 2.
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote
at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years
of age in such State.
Section 3.
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector
of President and Vice President, or" hold any office, civil or military, under
the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken
an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States,
or as a member of any State legislature or as an executive or judicial
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given
aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of twothirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4.
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.
But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5.
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.

Sec. 11. [Courts open—Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay;
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he is a party.

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

